LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF POLYGRAPH IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: PROS AND CONS

Abstract

The article offers a comprehensive analysis of the legal regulation of polygraph use in criminal proceedings in Ukraine. The very emergence of the polygraph in investigative practice is interpreted not merely as a technical innovation but as a manifestation of a deeper shift in legal consciousness: from trust in the human being as a bearer of will and dignity toward reliance on technical instruments presented as supposedly neutral “detectors of truth.” The methodological framework combines dialectical, comparative-legal, and hermeneutical approaches, which makes it possible not only to analyze legislative provisions and judicial practice but also to uncover broader cultural meanings embedded within legal formulas. It is demonstrated that Ukrainian legislation does not recognize polygraph examinations as admissible evidence, and the Supreme Court consistently holds that their results cannot be regarded as proper or reliable proof. At the same time, courts admit the possibility of treating such results as auxiliary information to be evaluated in conjunction with other materials of the criminal proceedings. This tendency resonates with international jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Scheffer categorically excluded polygraph evidence from criminal trials; the Supreme Court of India in Selvi v. Karnataka stressed that compulsory polygraph testing violates the right to privacy and the privilege against self-incrimination; the European Court of Human Rights in Saunders v. the United Kingdom and Jalloh v. Germany underscored the impermissibility of methods that threaten personal autonomy and human dignity. The research argues that the scientific reliability of the polygraph remains doubtful. Test results are heavily dependent on individual psychophysiological characteristics, the context of the interview, and the professional skills of the examiner. For this reason, the polygraph cannot and should not be elevated to the rank of admissible evidence. Its function may be confined to that of an auxiliary tool, yet even in this limited role, the use of polygraph examinations must be critically evaluated against European standards of human rights protection, which tolerate no compromise concerning the right to silence and the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment. The conclusions emphasize that the polygraph is less an instrument of discovering truth than a symptom of transformation in legal thought. Its integration into the evidentiary system would risk replacing the humanistic values of law with a technological rationality that erodes fundamental guarantees of justice. Thus, law must preserve its role as the guardian of human dignity against the temptation of “technical omnipotence.” The findings therefore, possess both theoretical and practical relevance: they delineate the boundaries of admissibility for innovative investigative tools in criminal procedure and provide criteria for further reform of Ukrainian legislation in compliance with international standards.