Abstract
The article examines public opinion on Ukraine’s NATO membership as an indicator of the reception, limits and managerial deficits of state strategic communication. The relevance of the study is determined by the fact that support for Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukraine has not developed linearly: before 2014 it remained unstable and regionally polarized; after Russia’s aggression in 2014 it underwent the first major turning point; and after the full-scale invasion in 2022 it turned into a much broader supra-regional consensus. The methodology combines secondary analysis of sociological data, historical-political periodization, comparative analysis of regional dynamics and elements of causal-historical reconstruction. The empirical base includes studies on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, research on Ukrainian public opinion under wartime conditions, and survey data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Razumkov Centre, Kyiv Security Forum, New Europe Center, IRI/Rating Group, NDI and other sources. The article distinguishes between event-driven and communication effects: the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas and the full-scale invasion are treated as security shocks that themselves changed threat perceptions, while strategic communication shaped the interpretation of these shocks, the stability of the Euro-Atlantic course and public trust in NATO. Three stages in the transformation of public opinion are identified: pre-war fragmentation with pronounced regional polarization; the turning point after Russia’s aggression in 2014; and the formation of a supra-regional consensus after 2022, accompanied by a new gap between support for membership, trust in the Alliance and belief in the realistic prospect of accession. The scientific novelty lies in treating public opinion not as direct proof of the causal impact of communication, but as an indicator of its reception, limits and managerial deficits. The practical significance of the findings is that state strategic communication should move from a mobilizing message about NATO as a non-alternative choice toward an explanatory model that clarifies the accession procedure, allied conditions, the role of military assistance and the limits of NATO’s responsibility.
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