INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE WORK OF PROSECUTORS

Abstract

The main attention is paid to the analysis of the essence of the principle of independence of the prosecutor’s office, its role in ensuring the objectivity and impartiality of prosecutorial activities. It is determined that the independence of the prosecutor’s office is a fundamental factor in protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as in guaranteeing fair justice. The absence of proper mechanisms for protecting the independence of the prosecutor’s office leads to selective justice, corruption and loss of public trust in the law enforcement system. International standards of independence of prosecutorial bodies, enshrined in the documents of the UN, the Council of Europe, etc., are studied. The compliance of the national legislation of Ukraine with these standards is analyzed, its shortcomings are identified and ways to improve regulatory and legal regulation in this area are outlined. The problems of internal independence of prosecutors are highlighted, in particular, their procedural independence, which is limited due to hierarchical subordination and internal orders. Attention is focused on the fact that prosecutors are often subjected to pressure from the leadership of the prosecutor’s office, which limits their ability to make objective decisions. It has been established that in Ukraine, the prosecutor’s office is often used as an instrument of political struggle, which is manifested in selective criminal prosecution or the blocking of investigations against officials associated with the government. Examples of high-profile cases in which the prosecutor’s office was politically involved are given. Particular attention is paid to issues of professional ethics and the level of legal culture among prosecutors. Cases have been identified where prosecutors themselves contribute to the violation of the principle of independence through corruption or the adoption of commissioned decisions. Based on the analysis, ways of improving mechanisms for ensuring the independence of the prosecutor’s office are proposed. Among the main recommendations: reforming the organizational structure of the prosecutor’s office, strengthening guarantees of the autonomy of prosecutors, creating independent disciplinary bodies to consider cases of interference in prosecutorial activities, and expanding mechanisms for public control over the activities of the prosecutor’s office.