VERTICAL PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS AS A TOOL FOR STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES UNDER MARTIAL LAW IN UKRAINE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
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Keywords

sunflower oil
vertical coordination
agricultural enterprises
partnership arrangements
resilience
martial law
European integration

How to Cite

Balan, V., & Tymchenko, I. (2026). VERTICAL PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS AS A TOOL FOR STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES UNDER MARTIAL LAW IN UKRAINE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Social Development: Economic and Legal Issues, (13). https://doi.org/10.70651/3083-6018/2026.1.20

Abstract

The full-scale war has sharply increased the dependence of Ukrainian agricultural enterprises on the quality of coordination along the “raw material producer – processor – exporter” chain, especially in the sunflower oil segment, where logistics disruptions, shortages of working capital and volatility of world prices directly affect the resilience of all market participants. The purpose of the study is to substantiate vertical partnership arrangements between sunflower seed producers and processing enterprises as a tool for strengthening the resilience of agricultural enterprises under martial law and European integration. The methodological framework combines structural-logical, comparative and analytical methods with elements of the institutional and value chain approaches. The empirical base includes USDA, FAO and UNCTAD data, sectoral market reviews and recent academic studies on vertical coordination, contract farming, agricultural value chain finance and the impact of war on the Ukrainian agricultural sector. The study shows that a predominantly spot-based interaction model intensifies price asynchrony, causes uneven deliveries, raises transaction costs and complicates the fulfilment of export contracts during periods of logistical stress. Partnership arrangements based on formula pricing, agreed delivery schedules, staged payments, advance financing and logistics booking reduce the risk of idle processing capacity, improve the predictability of raw material supply and support the producer’s financial liquidity. It is also demonstrated that, under European integration, such arrangements acquire an additional function by facilitating compliance with quality requirements, traceability and digital sales support. Vertical partnership arrangements should be treated as a managerial mechanism for stabilizing agribusiness rather than as an auxiliary form of cooperation. Their practical implementation can reduce vulnerability to wartime and market shocks, strengthen contractual discipline and support the continuity of export-oriented processing.

https://doi.org/10.70651/3083-6018/2026.1.20
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Copyright (c) 2026 Valeriy Balan, Inna Tymchenko