Keywords
power
executive bodies
public administration
political culture
How to Cite
Abstract
The relevance of the study is due to the need to ensure a balanced combination of defense management efficiency and compliance with constitutional guarantees in a period of large-scale security threats. The aim of the article is to find out how national mechanisms of constitutional control can ensure the proper balance between mobilization needs and the requirements of the rule of law, as well as what foreign practices can be useful for improving the Ukrainian model. The methodological basis of the study is comparative legal analysis, formal legal method, structural-functional approach and elements of the theory of constitutional control, which allowed for a comprehensive assessment of both regulatory and practical aspects of oversight in the defense sector. The study identified the strengths and weaknesses of the national model, revealed the specifics of the interaction between political and judicial control mechanisms, analyzed the impact of executive decisions on the state of constitutional guarantees, and outlined promising areas of reform using the experience of EU countries, NATO and states with developed crisis management systems. The results obtained demonstrate the need to modernize constitutional control procedures, increase the transparency of mobilization decisions, and strengthen the institutional capacity of bodies responsible for protecting rights and freedoms in wartime. The practical significance lies in the fact that the formulated conclusions and recommendations can be used by the legislator to update defense and constitutional legislation, in particular when improving mobilization procedures and parliamentary oversight. The results have practical significance for executive bodies that carry out defense planning and implement mobilization policy decisions. The proposed approaches can serve as the basis for developing new standards of openness, accountability, and proportionality in the field of national security.
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