Abstract
The article is devoted to the analysis of the activities of the special services of the Russian Federation as a key tool for implementing the state policy of aggression, identifying their main directions and methods of influence, and assessing the consequences for national and international security. Special attention is paid to the development of recommendations for countering this activity. The purpose of the study is to analyze the strategies, methods, and instruments of the activities of the special services of the Russian Federation in the context of aggressive foreign policy and to develop recommendations for countering their actions. In the course of the scientific research, general scientific methods were used, in particular: analysis and synthesis to identify the essence and structure of the activities of the special services; comparative analysis to compare the methods of their influence at different stages of aggression; a systematic approach for a comprehensive consideration of the interaction of the special services with state and military structures; as well as the method of logical generalization for formulating conclusions and recommendations, generalization, and a systematic approach. The features of hybrid war and special services as an instrument of the policy of aggression are indicated. International legal norms on the prohibition of aggression and the responsibility of states are systematized. The ideological basis of the activities of special services in the context of the policy of the "Russian world" is considered. The main areas of activity of the Russian special services used in the implementation of the policy of aggression are identified: information and psychological operations, cyberattacks, sabotage, support for terrorist groups and proxy structures. Specific examples (cases) of the use of Russian special services in foreign policy operations are analyzed – in particular in the context of armed aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas and the full-scale invasion of 2022. The focus is on the consequences of the activities of the Russian special services for international and regional security, as well as for the sovereignty of Ukraine. Mechanisms for countering the activities of the Russian special services and ways to strengthen national security are identified. In particular, the international reaction and legal mechanisms of the Russian Federation's responsibility for aggression and the actions of its special services are analyzed. The system of counterintelligence and cyber-defense measures of Ukraine is presented. The role of international partnerships in countering hybrid threats is characterized. Proposals are made to improve the state security policy of Ukraine.
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