Abstract
In the security setup of today's world, the non-state armed actors (NSAAs) have become a prevailing force in the conflict, alarm for a workable and joint set of actions for their annihilation. Unlike usual wars between states, the present dangers are more of a carry-over type that involves military, information, legal, humanitarian, and cyber warfare aspects. The paper aims to establish a working system of definitions for tactics to stop NSAAs and to explain their application in global practice, focusing on the interplay of various tools. This study presents a novel class of six strategic models, namely military, legal, informational, humanitarian, cyber-intelligence, and hybrid. Each model is backed up with international examples. The military model is corroborated by the fight against ISIS and Ukrainian support operations; the legal model captures the representation of international courts and procedures; the informational model is characterized by the counter-propaganda of ISIS through Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the humanitarian model is showcased by the provision of aid to people in Syria, Afghanistan, and African countries, and the cyber-intelligence model is focused on the tracking of the terrorists' communications like the “Glowing Symphony” which is a Pentagon operation; and the hybrid model combines all possible instruments to have a tactical, as demonstrated in the use of joint forces against the Taliban or the case of the complex response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. It is discovered from the results that no single model is good for all conditions and no one model is complete. The most productive course is the hybrid one, that is adaptable depending on complex issues of contemporary threats. The degree of success of the NSAA countermeasures is measured by the effectiveness of international cooperation, harmonizing political, military, and humanitarian intervention, and the ability to touch upon the peculiarities of each conflict in the area. Ultimately, the investigation underscores that, to prevent NSAA counter-strategies, we definitely need a multilevel approach between the state, international organizations, business, and the common people. Since the nature of conflicts that more often than not move beyond the traditional ways of war, the hybrid model that addresses both the safety, and socio-humanitarian issues is more optimistic as the way of developing a security policy to continue to be sustainable.
References
1. Rauta, V. (2019). Towards a typology of non-state actors in ‘hybrid warfare’: proxy, auxiliary, surrogate and affiliated forces. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 33(6), 868–887. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1656600
2. Kilcullen, D. (2014). Counterinsurgency: theory and reality. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/26/review-counterinsurgency/
3. Kuyper, J. W., Linnér, B. O., & Schroeder, H. (2018). Non-state actors in hybrid global climate governance: Justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness in a post-Paris era. Environmental Politics. https://docslib.org/download/3209190/non-state-actors-in-hybrid-global-climate-governance-justice-legitimacy-and-effectiveness-in-a-post-paris-era
4. Rühle, M., & Roberts, C. (2021). Enlarging NATO’s toolbox to counter hybrid threats. NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/03/19/enlarging-natos-toolbox-to-counter-hybrid-threats/index.html
5. Handler, S. (2022). The 5×5—Non-state armed groups in cyber conflict. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/the-5x5/the-5x5-non-state-armed-groups-in-cyber-conflict/
6. Zamir, M., & Kaunert, C. (2025). Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism—Reviewing the Problems in Strategic Communications Role in Counter-Terrorism. In Strategic Communications' Role in Counter-Terrorism: The Power of Counter-Narratives (pp. 11-63). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-89110-6_2
7. Hofmann, C., & Schneckener, U. (2011). Engaging non-state armed actors in state- and peace-building: options and strategies. International Review of the Red Cross, 93(883), 603–621. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000148
8. Felbab-Brown, V. (2023). Nonstate armed actors in 2023: Persistence amid geopolitical shuffles. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nonstate-armed-actors-in-2023-persistence-amid-geopolitical-shuffles
9. Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict. The RUSI Journal, 158(2), 40–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.787733
10. Forest, J. J. (2021). Digital influence warfare in the age of social media. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. https://jamesforest.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Ch1-Digital-Influence-Warfare.pdf
11. United Nations Security Council. (2016). Resolution 2261 (2016) [on establishment of a political mission in Colombia to monitor the ceasefire]. U.N. Doc S/RES/2261(2016). https://undocs.org/S/RES/2261(2016)
12. Brechenmacher, S. (2019). Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria after Boko Haram. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042
13. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2003, March 20). Law of Ukraine on combating terrorism No. 638-IV. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/638-15
14. United Nations Security Council. (2001). Resolution 1373 (2001) [Counter-terrorism]. U.N. Doc S/RES/1373(2001). https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)
15. United Nations Security Council. (1999). Resolution 1267 (1999) [on sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida]. U.N. Doc S/RES/1267(1999). https://undocs.org/S/RES/1267(1999)
16. International Committee of the Red Cross. (1977). Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 Dec 1978. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/995_200
17. Fritz, J. (2013). Counterinsurgency is not the problem. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2013/08/counterinsurgency-is-not-the-problem/
18. Isacson, A. (2021). A long way to go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years. Washington Office on Latin America. https://www.wola.org/analysis/a-long-way-to-go-implementing-colombias-peace-accord-after-five-years/
19. Cordesman, A. (2020). Afghanistan: The peace negotiations have become an extension of war by other means. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghanistan-peace-negotiations-have-become-extension-war-other-means
20. Steinbach, M. (2016). ISIL online: Countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment on the internet and social media. FBI National Security Branch. https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches-and-testimony/isil-online-countering-terrorist-radicalization-and-recruitment-on-the-internet-and-social-media-
21. BBC News. (2023). What is Russia’s Wagner group, and why is the UK banning it? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60503037
22. Brown, D. (2019). How the U.S. hacked ISIS. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis
23. NATO. (2024). Countering terrorism. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/topics_77646.htm
24. United Nations. (2006). United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy [Resolution A/RES/60/288]. https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/60/288

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2025 Dmytro Horilenko, Anastasiia Khmel
