Abstract
The article presents an interdisciplinary study of the phenomenon of meta-consciousness at the intersection of philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and mystical tradition. The aim is to integrate analytical, phenomenological, and spiritual-hermeneutical approaches to construct a unified model of meta-consciousness as a recursive process of self-observation. The object of the research is meta-consciousness as a multilevel phenomenon of human cognition that combines neurophysiological, cognitive, phenomenological, and mystical dimensions of self-awareness. The subject of the research is the integrative structure and mechanisms of the formation of meta-consciousness, in particular, the interaction between bodily-emotional, cognitive, and hermeneutic-mystical levels of self-observation, which ensure recursive self-knowledge and the experience of presence. It is noted that in classical European philosophy, the concept of consciousness underwent significant transformations – from the Cartesian cogito as the core of subjectivity to Husserl’s phenomenological description of intentionality. However, in both cases, consciousness was considered as a phenomenon centered around the knowing “I.” Contemporary cognitive philosophy expands this horizon by introducing the concept of “meta-consciousness,” that is, awareness of the very process of being aware. Drawing on philosophical (Husserl, Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty), cognitive-scientific (Varela, Metzinger, Thompson), and mystical (Rumi, Ibn ‘Arabi, Suzuki) sources, the author proposes a conceptual framework encompassing three levels: the core of consciousness – neurophysiological mechanisms of self-observation; the bodily-emotional field – integration of sensory and affective data; the recursive level – mystical processes of self-presence. Meta-consciousness is interpreted as a fractal structure, where each layer of experience reflects and reproduces others, forming a dynamic continuum of “awareness of awareness.” This model unites scientific rigor with existential depth, demonstrating that consciousness not only mirrors reality but also constitutes it through the act of presence. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the development of an integrative ontological–fractal model of meta-consciousness, which enables the synthesis of bodily, cognitive, and spiritual dimensions within a unified theoretical system.
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