




## Organizational and Legal Support of Anti-Corruption Mechanisms of Public Administration in the Sphere of Construction and Infrastructure Recovery

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### ABSTRACT

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The relevance of the study stems from the fact that the sphere of construction and infrastructure recovery in Ukraine combines high capital intensity, a large volume of public investment, multi-level coordination, a complex project cycle, and heightened vulnerability to discretionary decisions, conflicts of interest, and manipulation at different stages of project implementation. Under the conditions of full-scale war and large-scale post-war reconstruction, anti-corruption support in this sphere acquires independent managerial significance. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the organizational and legal support of anti-corruption mechanisms of public administration in the sphere of construction and infrastructure recovery and to develop a risk-oriented model for their integration into the full management cycle of a recovery project. The methodological basis of the study combines systemic, institutional, comparative legal, logical-analytical, and content-analytical approaches. The source base includes Ukrainian legal acts, OECD analytical documents, studies by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and the Basel Institute on Governance, materials from DREAM, CoST, Prozorro and DOZORRO, as well as recent academic works on corruption in construction projects, public procurement, and digital transparency. The article systematizes the stages of corruption risk concentration in the project cycle of construction and infrastructure recovery, characterizes the current institutional architecture of anti-corruption support, and generalizes the legal, institutional, digital, control, and civic instruments aimed at ensuring integrity. A cross-cutting model of anti-corruption support for a recovery project is proposed, combining prevention, digital traceability, internal and external control, audit, and public monitoring within a single integrity framework. It is shown that the practical value of this model lies in its potential use as an analytical and applied framework for improving the governance of recovery projects at the national and local levels. At the same time, the model requires further operationalization through a system of performance indicators, which opens a direction for further research.



### KEYWORDS

anti-corruption mechanisms, public administration, construction, infrastructure recovery, public procurement, transparency, Ukraine recovery, digital traceability.



## Організаційно-правове забезпечення антикорупційних механізмів публічного управління у сфері будівництва та відновлення інфраструктури

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### СТАТТЯ

### АНОТАЦІЯ

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Актуальність дослідження зумовлена тим, що сфера будівництва та відновлення інфраструктури в Україні поєднує високу капіталомісткість, значний обсяг публічних інвестицій, багаторівневу координацію, складний проектний цикл і підвищену вразливість до дискреційних рішень, конфлікту інтересів та маніпуляцій на різних стадіях реалізації проектів. В умовах повномасштабної війни та масштабної повоєнної реконструкції антикорупційний супровід у цій сфері набуває самостійного управлінського значення. Метою статті є обґрунтування організаційно-правового забезпечення антикорупційних механізмів публічного управління у сфері будівництва та відновлення інфраструктури та розроблення ризик-орієнтованої моделі їх інтеграції в повний цикл управління відбудовним проектом. Методологічну основу дослідження становлять системний, інституційний, порівняльно-правовий, логіко-аналітичний і контент-аналітичний підходи. Джерельну базу формують нормативно-правові акти України, аналітичні документи ОЕСР, дослідження НАЗК і Basel Institute on Governance, матеріали DREAM, CoST, Prozorro, DOZORRO, а також сучасні академічні праці з проблематики корупції в будівельних проектах, закупівлях і цифровій прозорості. У статті систематизовано стадії концентрації корупційних ризиків у проектному циклі будівництва та відновлення інфраструктури, охарактеризовано чинну інституційну архітектуру антикорупційного супроводу, узагальнено правові, інституційні, цифрові, контрольні та громадські інструменти забезпечення доброчесності. Запропоновано наскрізну модель антикорупційного супроводу відбудовного проекту, що поєднує превенцію, цифрову простежуваність, внутрішній і зовнішній контроль, аудит та громадський моніторинг. Показано, що практична цінність такої моделі полягає в можливості її використання як аналітичної та прикладної рамки для вдосконалення системи управління відбудовними проектами на державному та місцевому рівнях. Подальший розвиток моделі пов'язаний з її операціоналізацією через систему індикаторів результативності антикорупційного супроводу.



### КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА

антикорупційні механізми, публічне управління, будівництво, відновлення інфраструктури, публічні закупівлі, прозорість, відбудова України, цифрова простежуваність.

## 1. Introduction

The sphere of construction, reconstruction and restoration of infrastructure in Ukraine is one of the most vulnerable segments of public administration, as it combines significant amounts of public investment, multi-level decision-making, a large number of participants, the high cost of managerial errors and a long project implementation cycle [1; 2]. Corruption risks cover the entire project cycle: initiation, selection and prioritization of the project, design, conclusion and implementation of the contract, technical supervision, acceptance and payment for work [1].

The full-scale war significantly increased the managerial weight of the anti-corruption component in the sphere of construction and restoration. The need for rapid restoration of damaged facilities, the combination of budgetary, local and donor resources, accelerated procedures, personnel and time constraints, as well as a significant public demand for operational results form an environment in which discretion without proper legal and organizational safeguards turns into an independent risk factor [2]. The OECD emphasizes that Ukraine's post-war reconstruction will be accompanied by significant challenges in the field of public procurement, including corruption risks, and therefore requires strengthening the legal and institutional framework, transparency of procedures and the capacity of customers at different levels of government [2].

This is further confirmed by a specialized study of corruption risks in the construction, reconstruction and repair of civil infrastructure, prepared in 2025 with the participation of the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, the State Audit Service of Ukraine and the Basel Institute for Governance. It identifies ten priority corruption risks and shows that vulnerabilities arise at different stages of the reconstruction cycle, and therefore cannot be neutralized by procurement control tools alone [1]. This formulation shifts the emphasis from recording individual violations to analyzing the systemic architecture of risk management in the field of reconstruction.

At the same time, Ukraine has already formed an institutional and digital framework capable of strengthening integrity in this area. In 2025, the OECD assessed the strategic framework for integrity and combating corruption in Ukraine as institutionally developed, but one that requires further strengthening of practical effectiveness, supervision of the implementation of anti-corruption programs and control in high-risk areas of public administration [3]. In parallel, the state digital ecosystem DREAM operates, which provides a single digital framework for public infrastructure restoration and modernization projects [4]. The availability of digital tools and a regulatory framework leaves open the question of the content and structure of the organizational and legal support of anti-corruption mechanisms of public administration in the field of infrastructure construction and restoration.

The scientific problem is to determine a holistic design of organizational and legal support capable of combining prevention, transparency, monitoring, audit, public control and accountability in the field of infrastructure construction and restoration.

## 2. Literature Review

In modern international literature, corruption in construction is considered as a systemic property of the project environment, which combines a significant amount of public resources, technical complexity of decisions, multi-subject management, information asymmetry and significant room for discretion. J. Lehtinen, J. Locatelli, T. Sainati, K. Artto and B. Evans [5] in their study of anti-corruption measures in the project sector show that the effectiveness of combating corruption is formed through a combination of compliance, management, control, reactive and regulatory measures. K. Amoa and D. Stein [6] shift the focus to the professional and organizational level and prove that the prevalence of unethical practices in the construction sector is supported by the weakness of formal norms, barriers to their actual compliance, including environmental pressure, a culture of tolerance of violations and insufficient effectiveness of professional self-regulation. S. A. Zargami [7], summarizing forty years of research, concludes that corruption factors in the construction industry do not operate in isolation, but form an interconnected system in which political, institutional, economic and behavioral prerequisites reinforce each other. For this article, such a conclusion is fundamental, since it immediately takes the analysis beyond the narrow procurement approach and leads to the need to consider anti-corruption mechanisms within the entire project cycle.

A separate area of modern research focuses on tools for diagnosing and identifying corruption risks in procurement and contracts. F. Dekarolis and C. Giorgantonio [8], using Italian tenders for road works, develop an approach to identifying corruption risk indicators in public procurement and prove that the probability of corruption can be assessed not only through general institutional characteristics, but also through a set of procedural parameters recorded in the tender documentation. A. Soylu et al. [9] complement this direction, showing that even with formal disclosure of information, procurement transparency does not provide the proper anti-corruption effect without proper quality, compatibility and standardization of the data itself. For the construction industry, this conclusion is of particular importance, since the complexity of estimate, technical and contract information creates additional opportunities for masking risks even in formally open systems. The literature shows that operational transparency, suitable for control, comparison and detection of anomalies, has anti-corruption significance.

Further development of this line is associated with studies of the stages of corruption risk and management mechanisms for its reduction. G. Waxenecker and C. Prell [10], based on a longitudinal network analysis of local construction contracts in Guatemala, argue that the corrupt distribution of contracts is not supported by isolated cases of abuse, but by stable configurations of collusion, cost concentration and political influence. I. Suardi, G. Rossieta, C. Jackman and V. Dianti [11], in a mixed study of the Indonesian public sector, show that good procurement management is statistically associated with a decrease in corruption, with the preparatory phase of the procurement being the most vulnerable. A. K. Pushpita and J. M. L. Gultom [12] reach a similar conclusion, using empirical material from Indonesia to show that the introduction of e-procurement reduces corruption in public procurement, especially where the volume of procurement costs is significant. G. Ajorlolo et al. [13] further rank the corruption-vulnerable stages of the procurement cycle and show that the most critical are bid evaluation, contract management and procurement planning. Taken together, these works are important for this study because they move the discussion from the plane of general anti-corruption declarations to the plane of specific stages, procedures and management decisions, where the bulk of the risks arise.

The Ukrainian segment of sources on the topic of reconstruction is formed at the intersection of academic and analytical texts. Compared to the international literature, where a significant body of work on corruption in construction projects and public procurement has been formed, the Ukrainian context is mainly developing in the format of institutional reviews, risk analysis and digital practices of reconstruction management [1]. A study by the NACP, the State Audit Office of Ukraine and the Basel Institute for the first time systematically outlined ten priority corruption risks in the construction, reconstruction and repair of civil infrastructure for the reconstruction of Ukraine. The OECD, in two related reviews [2; 3], links the integrity of post-war reconstruction to the state's ability to ensure transparency of procurement, internal control, audit and proper separation of powers between levels of government. DREAM [4] sets out a digital transparency infrastructure for reconstruction projects, but its anti-corruption potential depends on how well the digital system is combined with legal procedures, managerial accountability and external control.

For the article, works that consider infrastructure transparency as a management mechanism, rather than technical data disclosure, are important. T. Saelawong et al. [14], using the material from Thailand, show the connection between transparency within the CoST and the budgetary efficiency of public procurement. A. Ambituuni [15] from the standpoint of the theory of principal-agent relations proves that the anti-corruption potential of infrastructure transparency depends on political, procedural and implementation prerequisites, and not on the disclosure of information as such. M. H. Mohamed, A. A. Mohamed and M. M. Mohamed [16] confirm, using the example of Somalia, that e-procurement can strengthen the anti-corruption capacity of the state only if it is properly institutionalized. For the Ukrainian topic, this means that the digitalization of reconstruction and anti-corruption support cannot be analyzed separately, since their real effect is determined by the quality of their combination within a single public administration system.

Modern literature already convincingly describes three large blocks of issues: the nature of corruption in construction projects, procedural and stage risks of public procurement, as well as the role of transparency, electronic systems and open data in reducing abuses. The scientific field lacks an integrated model that combines the stages of the project cycle, public administration entities, legal instruments, digital transparency infrastructure, internal and external control mechanisms and the specifics of post-war reconstruction. The outlined gap determines the research focus of the article.

### 3. Problem Statement

The purpose of the article is to substantiate the organizational and legal support of anti-corruption mechanisms of public administration in the field of infrastructure construction and restoration and to develop a risk-oriented model of their integration into the full cycle of reconstruction project management.

To achieve the goal, the following tasks have been defined:

1. to establish the key stages of concentration of corruption risks in the project cycle of infrastructure construction and restoration;
2. to characterize the current institutional architecture of anti-corruption support of reconstruction projects in Ukraine;
3. to systematize legal, institutional, digital, control and public tools for preventing abuse in the field of reconstruction;
4. to generalize international approaches to ensuring the integrity of infrastructure projects and determine the limits of their adaptation to Ukrainian conditions;
5. to propose a model of integration of anti-corruption mechanisms into the end-to-end project management cycle and outline the possibilities of its further operationalization through a system of performance indicators.

### 4. Methods and Materials

The study is analytical and synthetic in nature and is based on a combination of systemic, institutional, comparative legal, logical-analytical and content-analytical approaches. The systemic approach was used to consider the reconstruction project as a holistic cycle of interconnected management decisions, within which corruption risks shift between stages and require a broader analysis than a separate procurement procedure. The institutional approach made it possible to determine the range of entities that form, implement and control anti-corruption mechanisms in the field of infrastructure construction and restoration. The comparative legal method was used to compare the Ukrainian regulatory field with international approaches to the integrity of infrastructure projects, public procurement and digital transparency. The logical-analytical approach was used for the author's generalization, typology of risks, systematization of tools and construction of a model of organizational and legal support. Content analysis was applied to regulatory acts, official analytical documents, digital resources and scientific works related to anti-corruption policy, public investment management, reconstruction and openness of infrastructure data. The source base of the study is the regulatory and legal acts of Ukraine in the field of corruption prevention and public procurement, OECD analytical reports on integrity and public procurement in the process of post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, research by the National Agency for the Control of Corruption and Public Procurement and the Basel Institute for Governance on corruption risks in the field of construction, reconstruction and repair of civil infrastructure, materials of the DREAM system, CoST standards and approaches, Prozorro and DOZORRO analytics, as well as modern academic works on corruption in construction projects, public procurement risks, e-procurement and transparency of infrastructure investments. A separate group of sources consists of secondary quantitative data on the scale of recovery and the sectoral structure of the investment portfolio, used to illustrate resource concentration in high-value sectors of reconstruction. The combination of sources provided normative, institutional, numerical, comparative and applied levels of analysis.

### 5. Results and Discussion

The post-war reconstruction conditions dramatically increase the importance of a staged analysis of corruption risks. According to RDNA5, as of December 31, 2025, direct losses to Ukraine reached 195.1 billion USD, and the needs for recovery and reconstruction – 587.7 billion USD over ten years. At the same time, the OECD notes that the public investment management system in Ukraine is being strengthened, but limited capacity and incomplete integration of investment decisions with the budget process leave some projects without adequate financing and create additional space for inefficiency and corruption risks [17; 18]. Anti-corruption logic should cover the entire cycle: from project prioritization to acceptance and audit of completed works.

This approach is supported by the research of the NACP, the State Agency for State Audit of Ukraine and the Basel Institute for Governance, which identified ten priority corruption risks in the construction, reconstruction and repair of civil infrastructure for the reconstruction of Ukraine [1]. International and applied research demonstrates the same pattern: the most vulnerable stages are the stages of project preparation, tender design, proposal evaluation, contract management and confirmation of actual work performance [8; 10–13]. Transitions between stages, where discretion, technical complexity and weak verification are combined, become critical. Transparency International's practical review also links the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms to the coverage of contract preparation, procurement and implementation [19]. To systematize these vulnerabilities according to the logic of the full project cycle, Table 1 summarizes the key corruption risks and relevant anti-corruption tools by the main stages of the construction and reconstruction process.

**Table 1. Key corruption risks in the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure by project cycle stages**

Stage	Typical corruption risks	Anti-corruption tools
<b>Project Selection and Prioritization</b>	Unclear criteria for including objects in restoration plans; manual prioritization; political lobbying; opaque resource allocation	Standardized priority criteria; digital recording of decision grounds; public project register; openness of prioritization logic
<b>Design and Estimation</b>	Overestimation of estimated cost; manipulation of technical parameters; inclusion of redundant or artificially complicated solutions; weak verification of project documentation	Independent expertise; external verification of estimates; typical project solutions; standardized technical requirements
<b>Purchasing</b>	Discriminatory tender conditions; restriction of competition; collusion of participants; conflict of interest; formal compliance with the procedure without real competition	Competitive procurement through an electronic system; risk analytics; verification of the connection of participants; publicity of tender documentation
<b>Execution and Acceptance</b>	Unjustified changes to the contract; fictitious confirmation of volumes; overestimation of the cost of work performed; hidden quality reduction; formal closure of defects	Photographic recording; digital execution logs; technical supervision; audit of contract changes; independent technical verification
<b>Completion, Payment and Follow-up</b>	Signing of acts without proper verification; opaque final payment; weak post-project monitoring; difficult access to information	Internal and external audit; openness of key documents; access of donors and the public to data; control of operational results


Source: Compiled by the authors based on [1; 8; 10–13; 19].

Table 1 shows the shift of corruption vulnerability along with the project: from the prioritization stage to payment and control of the result. The most critical for the integrity system are the transitions between stages, when discretionary decisions are combined with technical complexity, incomplete verifiability of information and weak external verification. At the transitions between stages, conditions are created for overpricing, manipulation of project parameters, restriction of competition and non-transparent acceptance of works [1; 8; 10–13].

The scale of resource concentration in reconstruction further confirms that anti-corruption support in the construction and infrastructure sector should be considered a priority element of public administration. The greatest needs for restoration and reconstruction fall on transport, energy, housing, trade and industry, agriculture and social protection, which creates a high level of financial sensitivity of these sectors to corruption risks (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 shows the concentration of the greatest needs in the sectors of physical infrastructure and large capital-intensive programs. Corruption risk in reconstruction is structural in nature, since even individual management decisions regarding prioritization, design, procurement, or acceptance of works in these sectors can have a disproportionately large financial effect. With such a concentration of resources, not only the formal presence of anti-corruption norms becomes crucial, but also the institutional capacity of the state to ensure their implementation at all levels of government. The

institutional architecture of anti-corruption support in the field of construction and reconstruction of infrastructure is of a mixed nature and combines general public integrity bodies, sectoral managers and digital control tools. Its general framework is set by the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption”, which defines the legal and organizational principles of the functioning of the corruption prevention system [20]. In the sectoral dimension, the Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine and the State Agency for Rehabilitation and Development of Infrastructure of Ukraine play a key role. The official structure of the Reconstruction Agency shows that it operates through a central office, regional services, a centralized procurement organization, a project office, and advisory bodies, in particular the Transparency and Accountability Council [21]. This configuration indicates that the anti-corruption loop is embedded in the system of reconstruction project implementation, and not only in the activities of general anti-corruption bodies.



**Figure 1. The largest sectoral needs for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine in 2026–2035, according to RDNA5 estimates, billion USD**

Source: Compiled by the authors based on World Bank data.


At the same time, the OECD emphasizes that the strength of the Ukrainian anti-corruption system lies in the already established regulatory and institutional framework, while the weak points remain implementation, effectiveness, internal control and risk-based management [3]. In the field of reconstruction, a formally established system of entities requires clear procedures for accountability, verification and access to data. A clear definition of those responsible for prioritization, verification of estimates, control of contract changes, technical and financial verification, as well as access to data for external monitoring is of key importance.

The legal framework for anti-corruption mechanisms in the reconstruction sector goes beyond the Law of Ukraine “On Public Procurement”. Law No. 922-VIII does indeed define the legal and economic principles of procurement for the needs of the state and territorial communities [22], however, under martial law, procurement is additionally carried out taking into account the special regime established by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 1178 [23]. The legal framework for anti-corruption mechanisms in the reconstruction sector is formed by the interaction of the basic procurement law, special military regulations, anti-corruption legislation and subordinate procedural norms.

This construction determines the direction of improvement. The main problem is associated with insufficient standardization of critical decisions: project prioritization criteria, budget revision procedures, grounds and limits for changing essential contract terms, the mandatory digital execution trail, as well as the ratio of internal, external and public control. Ukrainian applied literature on open tenders in special conditions confirms that a military or simplified regime increases the risk of abuse in the absence of risk-oriented control, institutional capacity of customers and supervisory bodies [24].

Therefore, legal support in this area should reduce discretion not declaratively, but through procedural certainty and verifiability of each management action.

The digital component in the reconstruction sector has acquired an independent managerial significance. DREAM functions as a public investment management system that organizes key processes at all stages of this cycle and combines a single project portfolio, sectoral portfolios, a medium-term plan, an interactive map and analytical modules. As of October 2025, the state single project portfolio for 2026 had 131 projects and 64 programs, and its second update took place in March 2026 [25]. DREAM performs information and planning and prioritization functions, which gives the system direct anti-corruption significance, as it transfers critical decisions into the space of publicly available digital fixation. The practical significance of digital transparency tools is associated with their application to a specific state investment portfolio with a clearly expressed sectoral concentration. DREAM data shows that the updated state single project portfolio for 2026 is extremely unevenly distributed across sectors, with the bulk of the cost falling on energy and transport (Figure 2).



**Figure 2. Sectoral structure of the updated state unified project portfolio for 2026 in the DREAM system, UAH billion**

Source: Compiled by the authors based on DREAM data.

Fig. 2 shows the greatest importance of digital traceability in sectors with the highest concentration of funding. The dominance of energy and transport in the updated portfolio means that risk-based monitoring, data openness and standardized controls should be primarily focused on these areas. Digital transparency tools should be applied taking into account the sectoral concentration of resources and the associated corruption risks. In the current version of CoST IDS 2.0, the standard requires proactive disclosure of 40 core project and contract data elements, as well as 27 additional elements that can be disclosed reactively or on request. The infrastructure project life cycle in this standard covers seven stages: identification, preparation, tender management, implementation, completion, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning [26]. For the Ukrainian reconstruction sector, this is an important clarification, as it shifts control from the narrow procurement phase to the entire asset lifecycle.

In the case of Prozorro, the anti-corruption effect is formed through the electronic procurement format and analytical circuit. According to the EBRD, the development of risk-based indicators for ex-ante monitoring since 2018 and the launch of a separate risk monitoring system in 2021 have strengthened proactive supervision and increased the compliance of procedures with transparency requirements. In 2024, the average competition in the system was 2.38 participants per tender procedure [27]. In addition, a separate risk indicator portal is operating, which allows identifying procurements with triggered risks and using this data for monitoring [28]. Digital tools in the Ukrainian

system already create the basis not only for the disclosure of information, but also for risk-based control in real time.

The practical value of this approach is confirmed by cases of public analytical control. In March 2026, the DOZORRO team discovered a potential overpricing of UAH 508,000 in the purchase of rehabilitation equipment, which amounted to about 24% of the contract value, and transferred the materials to law enforcement agencies, after which criminal proceedings were opened [29]. This example is important as a demonstration of the practical effect of open data, analytical tools and public monitoring in anti-corruption support.

The organizational and legal support of anti-corruption mechanisms in the reconstruction sector should be considered as an interconnected system of tools. The legal component should fix the prioritization criteria, procurement rules, limits of contract changes, the procedure for verifying performance and requirements for data disclosure [22–24]. The institutional component covers the distribution of roles between the NACP, the State Audit Office of Ukraine, the relevant ministry, the Reconstruction Agency, local customers and control bodies [20; 21]. The digital component includes DREAM, Prozorro, risk indicators and standardized tools for disclosing infrastructure data [25–28]. The control component combines internal control, financial audit, technical verification and independent data verification [3; 19]. The public component relies on open data, analytical services and the ability of civil society to interpret and translate the digital footprint into substantive control [26; 29].

A summary of these components in Table 2 allows us to present the organizational and legal support of anti-corruption mechanisms as a multi-component system in which legal, institutional, digital, control and public elements must operate synchronously.

**Table 2. Components of organizational and legal support for anti-corruption mechanisms in the field of reconstruction projects**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Contents</b>	<b>Functional purpose</b>
<b>Legal</b>	Prioritization criteria; procurement rules; contract amendment limits; acceptance and payment procedures; data disclosure requirements	Limiting discretion and formalizing key decisions
<b>Institutional</b>	Division of powers between customers, NACP, DASU, line ministry, Recovery Agency, local authorities and other entities	Establishing accountability and coordinating control
<b>Digital</b>	DREAM; Prozorro; risk indicators; digital performance trails; standardized data disclosure	Increasing transparency, traceability, and analytical verifiability
<b>Control</b>	Internal control; financial audit; technical verification; monitoring of contract amendments; verification of actual volumes of work	Early detection of violations and risk correction
<b>Public</b>	Open data; independent monitoring; analytical interpretation; participation of local stakeholders and civil society organizations	Increasing external accountability and public legitimacy of recovery


Source: Compiled by the author based on [3; 19–29].

Table 2 shows the interdependence of integrity components. Legal norms require digital traceability; digital systems require clear responsibility for data use; control requires openness for external accountability. The anti-corruption effect is formed through the integration of tools into a single management loop.

The analysis conducted provides grounds for building anti-corruption support for a reconstruction project as an end-to-end system. At the project selection stage, standardized priority criteria, digital recording of the grounds for inclusion in the portfolio, and public display of decisions in DREAM are key [1; 25]. At the design and estimate stage, priority is given to independent expertise, verification of estimates, and limitation of space for technical manipulations [1; 19]. At the procurement stage, a combination of a competitive procedure, risk analytics, verification of the connection of participants, and control of anomalies in tender documentation is required [8; 27; 28]. At the stage of execution of works, digital traces of execution, technical supervision, audit of contract changes and

documented verification of actual volumes become crucial. At the stage of acceptance – independent technical verification, financial audit and openness of key data for donors, public and regulatory authorities [1; 19; 26].

The advantage of such an approach is to shift the focus from response after a violation to prevention, early identification of risks and real-time verifiability of decisions. The OECD in materials on the reconstruction of Ukraine explicitly emphasizes that for the sphere of public procurement in the post-war recovery, strengthening of legal and institutional frameworks, support of central procurement institutions and expansion of capacity of regional and local customers are critical [2]. Transparency International's practical review links the effectiveness of anti-corruption safeguards to the coverage of contract preparation, procurement and execution [19]. In Ukrainian conditions, organizational and legal support should be understood as a single integrity contour in which law, institutions, digital systems, and public control mutually reinforce each other. The logic of this approach should be presented in the form of an end-to-end model of anti-corruption support for a reconstruction project, where each stage of the project cycle is combined with the corresponding legal, institutional, digital, and control mechanisms (Fig. 3).



**Figure 3. End-to-end model of anti-corruption support for a reconstruction project in the field of infrastructure construction and restoration**

Source: Compiled by the authors.

The proposed model has analytical and applied value as a tool for designing anti-corruption support for a reconstruction project. Its effectiveness is determined by the institutional capacity of customers, the quality of primary data, the integration of digital systems, the availability of external control, and the stability of rules in a military and post-war environment. In an applied dimension, the model can be operationalized through a system of indicators that record the effectiveness of anti-corruption support at different stages of the project: the share of projects with publicly recorded priority criteria, the average level of competition in procurement, the frequency and structure of changes in essential contract terms, the share of projects with a full digital implementation trail, the share of objects with independent technical verification, the number of procurements with risk indicators triggered, and the share of eliminated violations based on monitoring results. Such operationalization translates the model from a conceptual plane into the format of a measurable management tool.

Comparative analysis of international experience confirms the feasibility of an integrated approach to the organizational and legal support of anti-corruption mechanisms. Research on the

Indonesian public sector [11] demonstrates that proper procurement management reduces corruption risks at the interface of planning, preparation and implementation. Works on infrastructure transparency and e-procurement [12; 14–16] associate the highest effect with a combination of data standards, procedural certainty, independent oversight and open access to information.

The Ukrainian case has several distinctive features that limit the mechanical transfer of external models. First, the scale of destruction and resource concentration in reconstruction are significantly larger than in most cases on which the relevant international literature was formed [17]. Second, some procedures are implemented in a wartime regime, where the speed of decision-making often competes with the depth of verification [22; 23]. Third, the Ukrainian system simultaneously combines state, local, donor and civil society actors in control, which enhances transparency but complicates coordination. For Ukraine, international experience is a source of principles of staged control, standardized data, risk-based monitoring, independent verification and institutional accountability, which need to be adapted to the logic of post-war reconstruction.

## 6. Conclusions

As a result of the study, it was found that corruption risks in the field of construction and restoration of infrastructure are systemic and staged in nature. They are concentrated at the stages of prioritizing projects, preparing project documentation, forming and adjusting estimates, purchasing, performing work, changing the essential terms of contracts, accepting and confirming actual volumes, which gives grounds to consider anti-corruption support as an end-to-end element of managing the life cycle of a reconstruction project.

The generalization of regulatory, institutional, digital and applied sources made it possible to show that the organizational and legal support of anti-corruption mechanisms in this area should be built as an integrated system that combines legal, institutional, digital, control and public components. The effectiveness of individual instruments depends on procedural certainty, distribution of responsibility, data traceability, technical and financial verification, as well as the possibility of external monitoring.

The proposed model of organizational and legal support is based on a risk-based approach, takes into account the staged nature of corruption threats and combines legal, institutional, digital, control and public instruments into a single integrity loop. The key difference of the model is the emphasis on prevention, early detection of risks and real-time verification of decisions.

The practical significance of the results lies in the possibility of using them as a methodological basis for improving the management system of reconstruction projects at the state and local levels, in particular when standardizing prioritization criteria, strengthening digital traceability, building risk-based monitoring and coordinating internal, external and public control. Further research should be directed at empirically verifying the proposed indicators of the effectiveness of anti-corruption support, calibrating them for different types of infrastructure facilities, and determining threshold values by which the relationship between the speed of implementation, transparency, data verifiability, and quality control can be assessed.

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