



Policies of Memory Regarding World War II as an Element of The European Collective Security System: Administrative and Legal Aspects

Svitlana Vlasenko ^{1*} ● Oleksii Verbovyi ²

¹ Educational and Scientific Institute of Public Administration and Civil Service, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Ukraine). Associate Professor at the Department of European Integration Policy, Doctor of Science in Public Administration, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor.

² Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (Ukraine). Associate Professor at the Department of Modern History of Ukraine, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Lawyer.

* Corresponding Author, e-mail: s_vlas_v@ukr.net

ARTICLE INFO

Research Article

DOI:

[10.70651/3041-2498/2026.3.20](https://doi.org/10.70651/3041-2498/2026.3.20)

Received:

16 February 2026

Accepted:

20 March 2026

Published online:

24 March 2026

Copyright © 2026

by authors



This is an open access journal and all published articles are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

ABSTRACT

This article examines European policies of remembrance regarding World War II, which constitute an important element of the collective security system in Europe. The study aims to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the administrative and legal foundations of European policies of remembrance regarding World War II. To achieve this goal, the study examines European collective memory and Ukrainian national memory. The methodological framework of the study comprises general scientific and specialized research methods from various fields of science, among which the methods of systems analysis, formal-logical analysis, legal analysis, content analysis, and the comparative-historical method played a significant role. The source base of the study consisted of international and Ukrainian legal acts that regulate and govern public policy regarding European collective and national memory. The results of the study demonstrate that the formation of the modern administrative and legal foundations of European memory policy regarding World War II consisted of the development of pan-European approaches to the assessment of Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes. The article examines the administrative and legal foundations for regulating issues related to the condemnation of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes, the recognition and commemoration of their victims, the memorialization of World War II, and so on. Attention is given to the inclusive dimension of contemporary European memory policy, which entails taking into account the historical past of various peoples (the Holocaust, the genocide of the Roma, and the genocide of the Crimean Tatar people). The article examines the role of international organizations in promoting educational and commemorative practices within the context of memory policy. The article analyzes the transformations of public policy on national memory in Ukraine in the context of European integration, particularly changes in commemorative practices after 2014, the legislative enshrinement of new approaches to commemorating World War II, the rejection of Soviet narratives, and integration into the pan-European memory discourse. It is concluded that contemporary European memory policy regarding World War II emerges as an important tool for strengthening collective security in Europe. It is based on coordinated legal and value-based approaches to condemning totalitarian regimes, honoring the memory of victims, and fostering a culture of accountability. Ukraine is actively integrating into the European memory space by adapting its own memory policy to European standards and values. At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian war highlights the need to further develop this policy as a tool for the legal assessment and condemnation of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the strengthening of the international legal order, and the consolidation of democratic states' efforts to counter contemporary threats.

KEYWORDS

European security, humanitarian security, public administration, post-conflict settlement, transitional justice, memory politics, totalitarianism, nazism, ruscism, Europe, Ukraine, European Union, Council of Europe.





Політика пам'яті про Другу світову війну як елемент європейської системи колективної безпеки: управлінсько-правовий аспект

Світлана І. Власенко ^{1*} ● Олексій В. Вербовий ²

¹ Навчально-науковий інститут публічного управління та державної служби Київського національного університету імені Тараса Шевченка (Україна). Доцент кафедри євроінтеграційної політики, д-р держ. упр., канд. іст. наук, доцент.

² Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка (Україна). Доцент кафедри новітньої історії України історичного факультету, канд. іст. наук, доцент, адвокат.

* Автор-кореспондент, e-mail: s_vlas_v@ukr.net

СТАТТЯ

АНОТАЦІЯ

Дослідницька

DOI:

[10.70651/3041-2498/2026.3.20](https://doi.org/10.70651/3041-2498/2026.3.20)

Отримана:

16.02.2026 р.

Прийнята:


20.03.2026 р.

Опублікована:

24.03.2026 р.

Авторське право

© 2026 авторів



Цей твір ліцензовано на умовах Ліцензії Creative Commons «Із Зазначенням Авторства – Некомерційна 4.0 Міжнародна» (CC BY-NC 4.0).

Стаття присвячена вивченню європейської політики пам'яті про Другу світову війну, яка є важливим елементом системи колективної безпеки в Європі. Мета дослідження полягає у комплексному аналізі управлінських і правових засад європейської політики пам'яті про Другу світову війну. Для досягнення мети до уваги взято політику європейської колективної та української національної пам'яті. Методологічну основу дослідження склали загальнонаукові та спеціальні методи пізнання різних галузей науки, серед яких значну роль відіграли методи системного аналізу, формально-логічного аналізу, правового аналізу, контент-аналізу, порівняльно-історичний метод. Джерельну базу дослідження склали міжнародні та нормативно-правові акти України, що регламентують і регулюють публічну політику європейської колективної та національної пам'яті. Результати дослідження демонструють, що формування сучасних управлінсько-правових засад європейської політики пам'яті про Другу світову війну полягало у виробленні загальноєвропейських підходів до оцінки нацистського і комуністичного тоталітарних режимів. У статті розкрито управлінські та правові основи регулювання питань засудження злочинів тоталітарних режимів, визнання і вшанування пам'яті їх жертв, меморіалізації Другої світової війни тощо. Приділено увагу інклюзивному виміру сучасної європейської політики пам'яті, що передбачає врахування історичного минулого різних народів (Голокост, геноцид ромів, геноцид кримськотатарського народу). Відстежено участь міжнародних організацій у поширенні освітніх і меморіальних практик у контексті політики пам'яті. Проаналізовано трансформації публічної політики національної пам'яті в Україні у контексті європейської інтеграції, зокрема зміни у комеморативних практиках після 2014 року, законодавче закріплення нових підходів до вшанування пам'яті про Другу світову війну, відмову від радянських наративів та інтеграцію до загальноєвропейського пам'яттєвого дискурсу. Зроблено висновок, що сучасна європейська політика пам'яті про Другу світову війну постає як важливий інструмент зміцнення колективної безпеки в Європі. Вона базується на узгоджених правових і ціннісних підходах до засудження тоталітарних режимів, вшанування пам'яті жертв і розвитку культури відповідальності. Україна активно інтегрується в європейський пам'яттєвий простір, адаптуючи власну політику пам'яті до європейських стандартів та цінностей. Водночас російсько-українська війна актуалізує необхідність подальшого розвитку цієї політики як інструменту правової оцінки та засудження воєнних злочинів і злочинів проти людяності, зміцнення міжнародного правопорядку та консолідації зусиль демократичних держав у протидії сучасним загрозам.



КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА

європейська безпека, гуманітарна безпека, публічне управління, постконфліктне врегулювання, перехідне правосуддя, політика пам'яті, тоталітаризм, нацизм, рашизм, Європа, Україна, Європейський Союз, Рада Європи.

1. Introduction

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, its violation of international law, the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, cause an analogy with the totalitarian Nazi regime during World War II. Today, the term “ruscism”, which corresponds to the essence of the term “Nazism” and is associated with the ideology and policy of the Putin regime in the modern Russian Federation, is not only widely used at the domestic level, but has also been introduced into scientific circulation, public administration and the national legal field. In particular, the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of State Policy of the National Memory of the Ukrainian People” of August 21, 2025 defines “ruscism” as “a type of totalitarian ideology and practices that underlie the Russian Nazi totalitarian regime formed in the aggressor state and are based on the traditions of Russian chauvinism and imperialism, the practices of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes” [38]. And before that, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine repeatedly used the term “ruscism” in its official acts [35; 36] and it is currently used in official documents and in official appeals of representatives of public authorities.

At the same time, the analysis of international acts and national legislation of European states gives grounds to assert that today within Europe the term “ruscism” has not received an official legal definition and has not been introduced into the legal field. However, its indirect application in international law is noted through generally accepted definitions in combination with the policy of the Russian Federation, which characterizes the essence of ruscism (in particular, “aggression”, “occupation of territories”, “human rights violations”, “war crimes”, “crimes against humanity”, “deportation”, “genocide”, etc.). Instead, the term “ruscism” became widespread in the political and public environment, especially in the countries of Eastern Europe, which were part of the former socialist camp [12].

Unfortunately, despite all the warnings and the words “never again”, etched into the world memory by millions of victims of Nazi totalitarianism, in Europe in the twenty-first century, there was again a need for a post-conflict settlement through the use of such an instrument of transitional justice as a tribunal for modern Russian criminals. This, in turn, actualized interest (both social and scientific) in the memory of the Second World War, post-war settlement of international relations in the European space and overcoming the Nazi totalitarian past.

2. Literature Review

In modern scientific discourse, research is conducted on a wide range of issues of memory politics in Europe. Among the researchers who paid attention to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were part of the former socialist camp are K. Balabanov and K. Karaman [1], D. Moses [18], V. Kaiser [11], A. Kudryachenko [13], V. Lozovyi [14], J. Mink and L. Neumeier [16], M. Petrakov [22], N. Roik [27], M. Frolov, O. Maklyuk and S. Cherkasov [8], A. Chervyatsova [4] and others.

The analysis of their scientific achievements gives grounds to assert that most studies contain the Second World War, since it occupies one of the central places in the European collective memory or the national memory of European countries. In particular, the Polish sociologist B. Mistal determined that the growth of public interest in collective memory in Europe, which was especially observed in the 1980s-1990s (the so-called “memory fever”), was influenced by several factors, among which the 50th anniversary of the Second World War and increased attention to the tragedy of the Holocaust played an important role [17, p. 2]. Ukrainian historian V. Vengerska also argues that the Holocaust is given a leading place in the politics of European collective memory [39, p. 136, 138].

These issues were considered somewhat more deeply by the Australian historian and political scientist D. Moses, who, analyzing the period of the Second World War and post-war reconstruction, traced in the national memory institutions of individual European countries and the European Union as a whole the tendency to spread theses about “double occupation” and “double genocide” of the population during the existence of totalitarian Nazi and communist regimes [18, p. 116, 120]. Moreover, he drew attention to the fact that the activities of one of the leading non-governmental institutions of remembrance in Europe today – the Platform of European Memory and Conscience – contributed to “the continuation of the non-hierarchical connection between the Holocaust and Soviet crimes” [18, p. 121].

3. Problem Statement

The purpose of the study is a comprehensive analysis of the managerial and legal foundations of public memory policy in Europe regarding the Second World War in the context of the modern architecture of European security. To achieve the goal, the European collective and Ukrainian national memory policy is taken into account.

4. Methods and Materials

The methodological basis of the study was made up of general scientific and special methods of cognition of various fields of science, which ensured taking into account the interdisciplinary nature of the problem posed. Among them, a significant role was given to the use of methods of systemic, formal-logical, legal analysis and content analysis (made it possible to study international and national regulatory legal acts, determine the administrative and legal foundations of the activities of memory policy subjects in Europe and Ukraine), as well as comparative and historical method (facilitated the disclosure of the conditions for the formation and implementation of the public policy of memory of the Second World War in Europe and Ukraine).

The source base of the study is made up of international acts (in particular, resolutions of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) and legislative and by-laws of Ukraine that regulate and regulate the public policy of European collective and national memory, as well as the works of domestic and foreign scientists in various fields of science, the object of study of which is the politics of memory in Europe and Ukraine.

5. Results and Discussion

The formation of a holistic modern model of the European memory policy took place simultaneously with the formation of the collective security system in Europe. After the integration of the former socialist countries of the Central and Eastern European region into the Council of Europe and the European Union (1990-2007), in the mid-2000s, the process of institutionalization of memory politics in Europe based on fundamental democratic values intensified. At that time, a single pan-European perception of the history of the Second World War was also formed and established.

One of the brightest markers of the unification of the European memory of the Second World War was the day of the end of the war in Europe (for a long time, Western European countries celebrated this day on May 8, and Eastern Europe on May 9). Among the first statements about the importance of war remembrance made at the highest political level was the statement of the Federal President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker, in a speech on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe during commemorative events in the Bundestag on May 8, 1985: "... Anyone who turns a blind eye to the past becomes blind to the present. Those who do not remember about inhumanity become vulnerable to new risks of infection" [2].

On May 12, 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution defining May 8, 1945, as the day of the end of World War II in Europe. The resolution used the term "pan-European tragedy" and raised the issue of uniting the memories of the EU member states, which, to form a common European memory and prevent the return of totalitarianism, "overcame the split between aggressors and victims, winners and losers" [5]. In general, the desire for reconciliation and compromise on the debatable issues of the past of the EU member states is justified by "common European interests" to unite and stabilize the European space in compliance with the principle of "unity in diversity" and recognition of the historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity of the peoples of Europe.

In Ukraine, too, in the context of European integration, there are significant shifts in the public policy of national memory in general and in relation to World War II in particular. After 2014, the process of legal consolidation and implementation in the public environment and socio-cultural space began. In particular, in 2015, the celebration of May 8 was introduced into national commemorative practices: the Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Measures to Commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the Victory over Nazism in Europe and the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II in 2015" of March 24, 2015 established the celebration of May 8 annually as the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation[25]; The Law of Ukraine "On the Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945" of April 9, 2015 established the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation on

May 8, and the Day of Victory over Nazism in World War II (Victory Day) on May 9 [33]; The Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Establishment of the Award of the President of Ukraine – the Jubilee Medal “70 Years of Victory over Nazism” of April 29, 2015 enshrined a symbol widespread in Europe – the red poppy flower (the medal featured the image of red poppies) [24], and for the first time in 2014, the red poppy flower was used as a symbol of victory over Nazism at solemn mass public events in Ukraine; The Law of Ukraine “On the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945” of May 29, 2023 established this day on May 8 [37]. Accordingly, starting from 2023, May 9 disappears in the legal field altogether as a holiday associated with the Second World War, while on this day, Ukraine, together with the member states of the European Union, annually celebrates Europe Day (established by the Decree of the President of Ukraine of May 8, 2023, No. 266/2023 [26]).

An equally important consolidating achievement of the European policy of memory of the Second World War and the post-war settlement in Europe was the formation of collective memory and the construction of memory constructs based on pan-European approaches to the perception and overcoming of the past associated with the two totalitarian regimes that existed in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. and unleashed World War II – Nazi and Communist. An important decision of the European community to normalize these commemorative constructs was the consolidation in the resolution of the European Parliament of May 12, 2005 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe of provisions on the establishment of a communist regime in European countries liberated from Nazi occupation as “the restoration of the tyranny caused by Stalin’s Soviet Union” [5].

Even more indicative in relation to this issue were the decisions of the European Parliament on the proclamation of August 23 as the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism (declaration of September 23, 2008 [6] and resolution of April 2, 2009 [7]). This combination, associated with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 23, 1939, testified to Europe’s readiness for an equal perception of the totalitarian Nazi and communist regimes, condemnation of the crimes committed by them and recognition of the victims of these crimes. In particular, the declaration recognized the mass deportations, murders and enslavements committed by these totalitarian regimes as falling under the category of war crimes and crimes against humanity [6]. In July 2009, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also declared the two totalitarian regimes, defining their common features – “genocide, violation of human rights and freedoms, commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity” [20].

In Ukraine, the Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes were condemned at the legislative level and clearly defined as criminal only in 2015, in the Law of Ukraine “On the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and the Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Symbols” [34]. It was based on several international legal acts regulating the legacy of both the Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes in Europe. Despite the comments and recommendations from the Venice Commission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (in particular, regarding the provisions on symbols, propaganda, denial of crimes, sanctions, etc.), this law was regarded as exercising the right of the state to freely introduce legislation that prohibits or criminalizes the use of symbols and propaganda of certain totalitarian regimes (provided that it meets the requirements of the European Convention and other regional and regional international legal documents in the field of human rights) [31].

Another component of the European policy of remembrance of the Second World War was the normalization of the issue of places of remembrance associated with the totalitarian past. On January 29, 2009, the PACE adopted a resolution “Attitude to monuments having a contradictory historical interpretation in the member states of the Council of Europe” [21]. It spoke of the need to distinguish between war graves and “victory monuments”, which are perceived as glorification of totalitarian regimes or former occupation forces; the issue of graves and burials of the remains of foreign soldiers and victims of war was settled; The need for extensive discussions between historians and other experts was recognized, etc.

In Ukraine, the memorialization of the Second World War is regulated by the Law of Ukraine “On the Perpetuation of the Victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945” of April 9, 2015. buildings, complexes (ensembles) and their parts, objects of monumental art, other objects, places of interest that perpetuate the memory of the events of the war, its participants and victims [33].

Today, the European community is paying more and more attention to the formation of an inclusive model of collective memory policy. Such a model provides for the expansion of European

collective memory by including events, phenomena, or figures of different peoples living in Europe. The principle of inclusiveness in this context implies the prevention of prejudice against individual countries and peoples; formation of equal and tolerant coexistence of all local memories according to the principle of “unity in diversity”; affirmation of the collective perception of each local memory, which is original and unique, as an integral and equivalent component of the European collective memory.

In view of the above, it is worth noting that the leading place in the policy of remembrance of the Second World War in Europe is occupied by the mass crimes of the Nazi regime against the Jewish people – the Holocaust. According to V. Vengerska, this tragedy today in the national memory of individual countries is a certain sign of commonality with civilized democratic Europe, and the attitude towards it is a marker of democracy and compliance with European standards [39, p. 136, 138].

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) played an important role in the institutionalization of Holocaust remembrance policy in Europe. It was founded in 1998, and in January 2000, at the Stockholm International Holocaust Forum (with the participation of representatives of 46 countries of the world at the level of heads of state, prime ministers, deputy prime ministers and ministers), its official registration took place. Currently, the IHRA brings together governments and experts from 35 member countries, 1 liaison country, and 7 observer countries, the vast majority of which are European [10].

As enshrined in the Stockholm Declaration of 2000, which is the main document of the IHRA, the activities of this organization are aimed at commemorating the victims of the Holocaust and the fighters against it; for the introduction, encouragement, and popularization of Holocaust education and research, in particular the inclusion of these issues in the school curricula of the European Union member states, etc. [9]. In addition, the Stockholm Declaration enshrines a provision on the establishment of January 27 as the European Holocaust Remembrance Day in all EU member states.

On November 1, 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution “Holocaust Remembrance” [28], which established the International Holocaust Remembrance Day – January 27. One of the tools of the Holocaust remembrance policy is educational activities, which should be carried out by individual member states at the national level and by the UN as a whole. And on January 26, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning any denial of the Holocaust [29]. Subsequently, full or partial denial of the Holocaust was also condemned in the UN General Assembly resolution of January 20, 2022, which paid special attention to countering Holocaust denial and preventing acts of genocide in the future, which was supposed to be achieved by strengthening educational work [30].

At the same time, in recent years, the tragedy of the Roma people has taken its rightful place in European memory policy – the mass exterminations by the Nazi regime during World War II (the IHRA qualifies it as genocide, although some scholars call it the Holocaust [15]). Currently, the IHRA pays great attention not only to the policy of remembrance of the victims of the Roma genocide, but also to the issues of prejudice against them in the post-war period. The IHRA Roma Genocide Ad Hoc Committee ensures the development and implementation of tools and mechanisms for outreach, research, commemoration practices and memorialization of the victims of national tragedy in Europe.

Every year on August 2, the International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Roma Genocide is commemorated (this date was established on November 23, 1996, by the Proclamation of the International Council for the Remembrance of the Roma Genocide, adopted by the leaders of Roma organizations in 10 European countries and the United States at the conference “Genocide-Memory-Hope” in Auschwitz). The place of the national tragedy of the Roma in the politics of European memory is vividly evidenced by the statement of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Marija Pejčinović-Burić, on the occasion of the International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Roma Genocide in 2023, in which she emphasized: “The Roma have a right that we must all protect: the right to memory” and named the teaching of the history of the Roma Holocaust among the tools for the implementation of such a right [19].

In Ukraine, attention is also paid to the outlined issues, in particular, the “State Target National and Cultural Program “Unity in Diversity” for the period until 2034” (approved in September 2023) provides for measures to restore and honor the memory of the Roma who suffered genocide during World War II. In particular, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, as the leading central executive body in this area, has been entrusted with the task of updating the thematic exhibition “Despised Genocide” and its presentation in the cities of Ukraine, holding a seminar on this problem, creating an educational online resource “Mapping the Roma Genocide and Its Memory” with information about the Roma genocide on the territory of Ukraine [3].

After the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognized in November 2015 the deportation of the Crimean Tatars from the Crimean Peninsula by the Soviet authorities as genocide of the Crimean Tatar people [18], it began to be recognized by European countries (in 2019 – Latvia and Lithuania; in 2024 – Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic; in 2025 – the Netherlands). In addition, in response to the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated May 8, 2024, to the governments and parliaments of foreign states, to international organizations and parliamentary assemblies, a group of PACE deputies signed a written statement on July 2, 2024, in which they called for the recognition of the act of genocide of the Crimean Tatar people in 1944 [23].

Today, the management and legal support of the policy of memory in Europe is aimed at solving new challenges caused by the war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, violating international agreements and agreements, committing war crimes and crimes against humanity on Ukrainian territory. Those narratives that form the basis of modern European collective memory can be seen as tools for countering Russian narratives spread in the world, and as a significant force against the racist regime, whose ideology has imperial and communist roots. Currently, the international community is faced with the question of forming a policy of remembrance to overcome the consequences of the racist regime and holding a tribunal over modern war criminals in the XXI century. In the center of Europe, they are committing genocide against the Ukrainian people.

6. Conclusions

The modern European policy of remembrance of the Second World War is an important element of the system of collective security of Europe. Its formation took place through the gradual formation of managerial and legal foundations for joint approaches to understanding the totalitarian past, condemnation of the crimes of the Nazi and communist regimes, the formation of a culture of responsibility and preventing the recurrence of similar tragedies in the future. It is based on pan-European principles and standards enshrined in the practice of the institutions of the European Union and the Council of Europe, implemented in the national legislation of the member states. Important components of this policy were the legal regulation of issues of historical memory, commemorative practices, the development of inclusive approaches and recognition of the victims of the Holocaust, the genocide of the Roma and Crimean Tatars, as well as other crimes of totalitarian regimes.

Ukraine, taking a course towards European integration, has actively joined these processes, transforming its own memory policy in accordance with European standards and values. This was manifested in the legislative condemnation of totalitarian regimes, the rethinking of historical narratives, the change of the commemorative calendar and the gradual integration of the Ukrainian experience into the pan-European context.

At the same time, the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has actualized the need to rethink the European politics of memory in the new conditions. The emergence and spread of the concept of “ruscism” indicates an attempt to conceptualize modern manifestations of the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation through the prism of the historical experience of the twentieth century. Despite the lack of an established international legal definition of this term, its meaning is actually revealed through the qualification of the actions of the Russian Federation as aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide of the Ukrainian people.

Given the role of memory politics in the modern European security space, in strengthening democratic values and social resilience, it is advisable to consider it as a multidimensional tool of transitional justice, in particular in the context of the legal qualification of modern international conflicts. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the European policy of remembrance is seen as an effective mechanism for countering aggression. Therefore, the need for further international administrative and legal regulation of this policy, the formation of generally accepted approaches to assessing the crimes of the modern Russian regime based on international law, the creation of effective mechanisms for bringing the perpetrators to justice (including the creation of an international tribunal), the formation of common symbolic practices and unambiguous narratives, the development of educational strategies and scientific programs is of particular importance.

References

1. Balabanov, K., & Karaman, K. (2021). Historical Memory in Eurosceptic Discourse. *Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler ve Eğitim Dergisi – USBED*, 3(5), 393–410. <https://izlik.org/JA25BT65RZ>
2. Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker bei der Gedenkveranstaltung im Plenarsaal des Deutschen Bundestages zum 40. Jahrestag des Endes des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Europa am 8. Mai 1985 in Bonn. (1985). *Der Bundespräsident*. https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2015/02/150202-RvW-Rede-8-Mai-1985.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
3. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2023). *Rozporiadzhennia Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrainy "Pro zatverdzhennia Derzhavnoi tsilovoi natsionalno-kulturnoi prohramy "Yednist u rozmaitti" na period do 2034 roku"* [On approval of the State Targeted National and Cultural Program "Unity in Diversity" for the period until 2034] (No. 850-r). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/850-2023-%D1%80#Text> (in Ukrainian)
4. Cherviatsova, A. (2021). Memory as a battlefield: European memorial laws and freedom of speech. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 25(4), 675–694. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2020.1791826>
5. European Parliament. (2005). *European Parliament resolution on the future of Europe sixty years after the Second World War* (P6_TA(2005)0180). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-6-2005-0180_EN.pdf
6. European Parliament. (2008). *Declaration of the European Parliament on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism* (P6_TA(2008)0439). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-6-2008-0439_EN.pdf
7. European Parliament. (2009). *European Parliament resolution of 2 April 2009 on European conscience and totalitarianism* (P6_TA(2009)0213). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-6-2009-0213_EN.pdf
8. Frolov, M. O., Makliuk, O. M., & Cherkasov, S. S. (2021). Istorychna polityka ta polityka pam'iaty u fokusi doslidzhen tsentralno-skhidnoievropejskykh analitychnykh tsentriv [Historical politics and the politics of memory in the focus of research by Central and Eastern European think tanks]. *Zaporizkyj istorychnyj ohliad*, 5(57), 173–183. <https://history.znu.edu.ua/index.php/journal/article/view/2358> (in Ukrainian)
9. International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. (n.d.). *Stockholm Declaration*. <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/stockholm-declaration>
10. International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. (n.d.). *The IHRA Member Countries*. <https://holocaustremembrance.com/who-we-are/member-countries#the-ihra-member-countries>
11. Kaiser, W. (2025). History and Memory in the European Parliament: Reflections on Transgressing Boundaries between Academia and Politics. *Forum EUrope: cultures, memories, identities*, (1), 6–23. <https://doi.org/10.35219/europe.2025.1.01>
12. Kamusella, T. (2022). Russian and Rashism: are Russian language and literature really so great? *New Eastern Europe*, (6). <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/12/08/russian-and-rashism-are-russian-language-and-literature-really-so-great/>
13. Kudriachenko, A. I. (2023). Problema istorychnoi pam'iaty: ievropejskyj dyskurs (1945-2020 rr.): Za materialamy dopovidi na zasidanni Prezydii NAN Ukrainy 11 sichnia 2023 roku [The problem of historical memory: European discourse (1945-2020): Based on the materials of the report at the meeting of the Presidium of the NAS of Ukraine on January 11, 2023]. *Visnyk NAN Ukrainy*, (3), 60–71. <https://ivinas.gov.ua/publikatsiji/statti/kudriachenko-a-i-2023-problema-istorychnoi-pamiaty-ievropejskyi-dyskurs-19452020-rr-za-materialamy-dopovidi-na-zasidanni-prezydii-nan-ukrainy-11-sichnia-2023-roku-visnyk-nan-ukrainy-3-60-71.html> (in Ukrainian)
14. Lozovyj, V. S. (2017). Istorychna polityka v krainakh Yevropejskoho Soiuzu iak chynnyk konsolidatsii suspilstva ta prymyrennia narodiv: dosvid dlia Ukrainy [Historical politics in the countries of the European Union as a factor in the consolidation of society and reconciliation of peoples: experience for Ukraine]. *Stratehichna panorama*, (1), 30–35. http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Stpa_2017_1_7 (in Ukrainian)
15. Lutz, V. (1995). Gypsies as Victims of the Holocaust. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 9(3), 346–359. <https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/9.3.346>
16. Mink, Zh., Nejmajier, L., & Bonnar, P. (2015). *Yevropa ta ii bolisni mynuvshyny* [Europe and its painful past]. Nika-Tsentr. (in Ukrainian)
17. Misztal, B. A. (2003). *Theories of social remembering*. Open University Press.
18. Moses, A. D. (2022). Partisan History and the East European Region of Memory. In S. Lewis, J. Olick, J. Wawrzyniak, & M. Pakier (Eds.), *Regions of Memory. Transnational Formations* (pp. 101–138). Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93705-8_5

19. Ofis Rady Yevropy v Ukraini. (2023, 2 serpnia). *Mizhnarodnyj den pam'iaty zhertv Holokostu romiv* [International Roma Holocaust Remembrance Day]. <https://www.coe.int/uk/web/kyiv/-/european-roma-holocaust-memorial-day> (in Ukrainian)
20. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. (2009). *Vilnius declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and recommendations adopted at the eighteenth annual session*. <https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/all-documents/annual-sessions/2009-vilnius/declaration-6/261-2009-vilnius-declaration-eng/file>
21. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. (2009). *Attitude to memorials exposed to different historical interpretations in Council of Europe member states* (Resolution No. 1652(2009)). <https://pace.coe.int/pdf/9c12678bd4d6364e94ba9b1fac91e131a011d6eb37c6c4228b4535750af1b45d/res.%201652.pdf>
22. Petrakov, M. O. (2024). Trydtsiat rokiv polityky pam'iaty v Yevropejskomu Soiuzi: natsionalni ta nadnatsionalni naratyvy spilnoho majbutnoho [Thirty years of memory politics in the European Union: national and supranational narratives of a common future]. *Politychne zhyttia*, (3), 39–52. <https://doi.org/10.31558/2519-2949.2024.3.5> (in Ukrainian)
23. Predstavnytstvo Prezydenta Ukrainy v Avtonomnij Respublitsi Krym. (2024, 18 travnia). *Parlamentska asambleia Rady Yevropy zaklykala vyznaty deportatsiiu 1944 roku aktom henotsydu krymskotatarskoho narodu* [The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called for recognizing the 1944 deportation as an act of genocide against the Crimean Tatar people]. <https://ppu.gov.ua/press-center/parlamentska-asambleia-rady-yevropy-zaklykala-vyznaty-deportatsiiu-1944-roku-aktom-henotsydu-krymskotatarskoho-narodu/> (in Ukrainian)
24. President of Ukraine. (2015). *Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy "Pro vstanovlennia vidznaky Prezydenta Ukrainy – iuvilejnoi medali "70 rokiv Peremohy nad natsyzmom""* [On the establishment of the award of the President of Ukraine – the jubilee medal "70 years of Victory over Nazism"] (No. 249/2015). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/249/2015#Text> (in Ukrainian)
25. President of Ukraine. (2015). *Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy "Pro zakhody z vidznachennia u 2015 rotsi 70-i richnytsi Peremohy nad natsyzmom u Yevropi ta 70-i richnytsi zavershennia Druhoi svitovoi vijny"* [On the events marking the 70th anniversary of the Victory over Nazism in Europe and the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2015] (No. 169/2015). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/169/2015#Text> (in Ukrainian)
26. President of Ukraine. (2023). *Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy "Pro Den Yevropy"* [About Europe Day] (No. 266/2023). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/266/2023#Text> (in Ukrainian)
27. Roik, N. (2020). Dosvid konstruiuvannia istorychnoi pam'iaty prymyrennia v Zakhidnij i Tsentralnij Yevropi [The experience of constructing historical memory of reconciliation in Western and Central Europe]. *Hileia*, 156(5), 343–350. <http://gileya.org/index.php?ng=library&cont=long&id=226> (in Ukrainian)
28. UN General Assembly. (2005). *Holocaust remembrance* (A/RES/60/7). <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F60%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>
29. UN General Assembly. (2007). *Holocaust denial* (A/RES/61/255). <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F61%2F255&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>
30. UN General Assembly. (2022). *Holocaust denial* (A/RES/76/250). <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES%2F76%2F250&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>
31. Venice Commission, & OSCE/ODIHR. (2015). *Spilnyj promizhnyj vysnovok schodo Zakonu Ukrainy "Pro zasudzhennia komunistychnoho ta natsional-sotsialistychnoho (natsystskoho) totalitarnykh rezhymiv v Ukraini ta zaboronu propahandy ikhnoi symboliky"* [On the condemnation of communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the prohibition of the propaganda of their symbols] (Opinion No. 823/2015 & FOE-UKR/280/2015). <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/f/216291.pdf> (in Ukrainian)
32. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2015). *Postanova Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy "Pro vyznannia Henotsydu krymskotatarskoho narodu"* [On the recognition of the Genocide of the Crimean Tatar people] (No. 792-VIII). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/792-19#Text> (in Ukrainian)
33. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2015). *Zakon Ukrainy "Pro uvichnennia peremohy nad natsyzmom u Druhiy svitovij vijni 1939-1945 rokiv"* [On the perpetuation of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945] (No. 315-VIII). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/315-19#Text> (in Ukrainian)
34. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2015). *Zakon Ukrainy "Pro zasudzhennia komunistychnoho ta natsional-sotsialistychnoho (natsystskoho) totalitarnykh rezhymiv v Ukraini ta zaboronu propahandy ikhnoi symboliky"* [On the condemnation of communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and the

- prohibition of the propaganda of their symbols] (No. 317-VIII). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/317-19#Text> (in Ukrainian)
35. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2022). *Postanova Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy "Pro Zaiavu Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z nahody 77-i richnytsi peremohy nad natsyzmom ta pro neprypustymist prysvoiennia Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu peremohy nad natsyzmom"* [On the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the occasion of the 77th anniversary of the victory over Nazism and on the inadmissibility of the Russian Federation attributing the victory over Nazism] (No. 2235-IX). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2235-20#Text> (in Ukrainian)
36. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2023). *Postanova Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy "Pro Zaiavu Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy "Pro vykorystannia politychnym rezhymom rosijskoi federatsii ideolohii rashyzmu, zasudzhennia zasad i praktyk rashyzmu iak totalitarnykh i liudynonenavysnytskykh"* [On the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the use of the ideology of racism by the political regime of the Russian Federation, condemnation of the principles and practices of racism as totalitarian and misanthropic"] (No. 3078-IX). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3078-20#Text> (in Ukrainian)
37. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2023). *Zakon Ukrainy "Pro Den pam'iaty ta peremohy nad natsyzmom u Druhiy svitoviy vijn 1939-1945 rokiv"* [About the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism in World War II 1939-1945] (No. 3107-IX). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3107-20#Text> (in Ukrainian)
38. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. (2025). *Zakon Ukrainy "Pro zasady derzhavnoi polityky natsionalnoi pam'iaty Ukrainskoho narodu"* [On the principles of the state policy of national memory of the Ukrainian people] (No. 4579-IX). <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4579-20/ed20250821#n28> (in Ukrainian)
39. Venherska, V. (2021). Instrumentalizatsiia pam'iaty pro Druhu svitovu vijnu na postradianskomu prostori ta v krainakh TsSYe [Instrumentalization of the memory of World War II in the post-Soviet space and in the countries of CEE]. *Drynovskyj zbirnyk*, (14), 135–142. <https://doi.org/10.7546/DS.2021.14.16> (in Ukrainian)