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From “Failure of Politics” to the Imperative of Survival: The Conceptual Transformation of Securitization Theory in the Contemporary Era

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Under the conditions of modern international anarchy, a state's capacity for rapid mobilization takes precedence over adherence to the procedures of “normal politics.” This research proposes a departure from the normative stigmatization of security measures and substantiates the “security state” model, wherein the priority of efficiency and sovereignty protection dissolves the traditional dichotomy between security and liberty. The relevance of this study is driven by the need to reconceptualize the phenomenon of securitization, which, under the pressure of an anarchic environment, is evolving from a temporary instrument into a permanent principle of political space organization. The article aims to analyze the transformation of securitization theory in contemporary discourse and to justify the shift in the status of security practices from “normative aberrations” (“a failure of politics”) to decisions essential for state survival (the “security state”) amidst technological change. The study is based on the methodology of qualitative conceptual analysis and critical synthesis. An interpretivist approach is applied to compare the liberal-institutional view, structural and neoclassical realism, the theory of “Just Securitization”, and the sociological approach of the Paris School. The article proves the theoretical inadequacy of the liberal approach, which viewed securitization as a “pathology,” in the context of the “relative gains” dilemma. Based on neoclassical realism, it is shown that for democracies prone to “underbalancing” and strategic inertia, securitization serves as a necessary tool for resource mobilization. The role of ontological security is analyzed, explaining states' need for stable identity narratives to preserve their agency. Special attention is paid to the “technological turn”: it is substantiated that the development of mass surveillance and the automation of warfare transform securitization into a “pragmatic act” that precedes political decisions. It is revealed that in the modern world, democracy is forced to adapt to the logic of efficiency to withstand authoritarian threats. It is concluded that the “security vs. Democracy” dichotomy is losing its relevance. The formation of a “security state” model, where the state of emergency becomes permanent, is an inevitable reaction to structural anarchy and technological challenges. Securitization today is not an elite choice but an unavoidable mechanism for preserving sovereignty and ensuring the physical survival of the political nation.




KEYWORDS

securitization, Copenhagen School, security, security policy, security state, international anarchy.



Від «провалу політики» до імперативу виживання: концептуальна трансформація теорії сек'юритизації в епоху сучасності

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СТАТТЯ

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В умовах сучасної міжнародної анархії здатність держави до швидкої мобілізації стає важливішою за дотримання процедур «нормальної політики». Дослідження пропонує відхід від нормативної стигматизації безпекових заходів та обґрунтовує модель «безпекової держави», де пріоритет ефективності та захисту суверенітету нівелює традиційну дихотомію між безпекою і свободою. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена необхідністю концептуального переосмислення феномену сек'юритизації, який під тиском анархічного середовища еволюціонує з тимчасового інструменту в постійний принцип організації політичного простору. Метою статті є аналіз трансформації теорії сек'юритизації в сучасному дискурсі та обґрунтування зміни статусу безпекових практик із категорії «нормативних відхилень» («провалу політики») у статус рішень, необхідних для виживання держави («безпекової держави») в умовах технологічних змін. Дослідження ґрунтується на методології якісного концептуального аналізу та критичного синтезу. Застосовано інтерпретативістський підхід для порівняння ліберально-інституційного погляду, структурного та неокласичного реалізму, теорії «справедливої сек'юритизації» та соціологічного підходу Паризької школи. У статті доведено теоретичну неспроможність ліберального підходу, який розглядав сек'юритизацію як «патологію», в умовах дилеми «відносних вигод». На основі неокласичного реалізму показано, що для демократій, схильних до «недобалансування» та стратегічної інертності, сек'юритизація виступає необхідним інструментом мобілізації ресурсів. Проаналізовано роль онтологічної безпеки, яка пояснює потребу держав у стабільних наративах ідентичності для збереження суб'єктності. Особливу увагу приділено «технологічному повороту»: обґрунтовано, що розвиток засобів масового нагляду та автоматизація війни перетворюють сек'юритизацію на «прагматичний акт», який випереджає політичні рішення. Виявлено, що в сучасному світі демократія змушена адаптуватися до логіки ефективності, щоб протистояти авторитарним загрозам. Зроблено висновок, що дихотомія «безпека проти демократії» втрачає релевантність. Формування моделі «безпекової держави», де режим надзвичайної ситуації стає перманентним, є неминучою реакцією на структурну анархію та технологічні виклики. Сек'юритизація нині вже не розглядається як опція вибору еліт, а є безальтернативним механізмом збереження суверенітету та фізичного виживання політичної нації.



КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА

сек'юритизація, Копенгагенська школа, безпека, політика безпеки, безпекова держава, міжнародна анархія.

1. Introduction

Modern international relations are undergoing a stage of radical transformation, characterized by the return of fierce power competition and the erosion of liberal mechanisms of global regulation. In the face of growing structural uncertainty and the emergence of new existential threats, traditional theoretical approaches that interpreted enhanced security measures as a deviation from the democratic norm require critical revision. The events of the Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrate that the ability to promptly mobilize resources and consolidate society around security narratives is becoming not so much a political choice as a key condition for preserving state sovereignty. Therefore, the need for a conceptual rethinking of the phenomenon of securitization, which, under the pressure of the anarchic environment and technological progress, is evolving from a temporary tool into a permanent principle of organizing the political space.

2. Literature Review

The academic debate on the phenomenon of securitization and the nature of security in modern international relations has gone through a complex path of transformation, which can be roughly divided into three conceptual stages: the dominance of the liberal-critical consensus, the renaissance of neorealism and the modern techno-sociological turn. The foundation of the modern debate was laid in the polemic between neoliberal institutionalism and classical security studies. Representatives of the liberal direction, primarily R. Keohane [14], articulated the thesis about the ability of international organizations and treaties to neutralize the uncertainty of the anarchic environment, turning security competition into cooperation. At the same time, representatives of the Copenhagen school – B. Buzan et al. [5] formulated the classical theory of securitization. In their interpretation, the transfer of the issue to the plane of security was seen as a “failure of normal politics”, an emergency measure that democratic societies should avoid. However, this normative optimism was subjected to devastating criticism from realists, who returned the unchanging nature of anarchy to the focus of the study. K. N. Waltz [24] postulated the priority of survival over well-being, pointing out the impossibility of deep integration in the self-help system. This line of argumentation was deepened by J. M. Grieco [12], who, through the concept of “relative benefits”, proved that states refuse to cooperate not because of lack of information, but because of the fear of strengthening the partner. The modern development of this paradigm is presented in the works of J. J. Mearsheimer [16; 17], who emphasizes the inevitability of power competition and characterizes the liberal world order as a temporary illusion doomed to collapse under the pressure of nationalism and realpolitik. A similar logic in the regional dimension is used by E. Götz [11], interpreting the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine through the prism of structural factors of the security environment.

The second vector of the discussion shifted from external factors to internal processes of mobilization, which became the subject of analysis of neoclassical realism. R. L. Schweller [21] introduced the concept of “underbalance” into scientific circulation, explaining why fragmented democracies are often unable to respond to threats in time. His colleagues, in particular T. Christensen [6] and F. Zakaria [26], focused on the gap between the nation’s available resources and the government’s ability to mobilize them. The methodological bridge between material and ideological factors in this context is formulated by J. S. Barkin [3] through the approach of “realistic constructivism”. A separate layer of literature is devoted to the existential and ethical aspects of security. B. J. Steele [22] and J. Mitzen [18] develop a theory of ontological security, arguing that states need stable conflict narratives to preserve identity. At the same time, there is a “normative turn” in the interpretation of emergency measures: R. Floyd [8] and M. Walzer [25] substantiate the moral legitimacy of securitization in cases where it is aimed at protecting just goals in the face of a real threat. The most modern stage of the discussion is characterized by a departure from political science analysis to sociological and techno-philosophical. T. Balzacq [2] proposes to consider securitization as a pragmatic tool, and not a linguistic act. D. Bigo [4] and M. Neocleous [20] focus on the role of bureaucratic networks that automate exclusion processes. This direction is also rooted in the works of J. Ellul [7] and P. Virillo [23], who consider safety as a derivative of the technological imperative of speed and efficiency.

3. Problem Statement

The article aims to conceptually reevaluate the phenomenon of securitization in modern political science discourse and substantiate the transformation of security practices from a category of “normative deviations” to an institutional imperative for state survival in the conditions of international anarchy and technological acceleration. To achieve this goal, the following tasks have been defined: (1) to analyze the theoretical failure of the liberal-institutionalist approach to the interpretation of securitization in the context of intensified structural competition and the dilemma of “relative benefits” in the international system; (2) to investigate the mechanisms of intrastate mobilization through the prism of neoclassical realism, determining the role of securitization as a tool for overcoming the strategic inertia (“underbalance”) of democratic regimes; (3) to reveal the importance of ontological security and the construction of conflict narratives for the preservation of the identity of the state and ensuring its political subjectivity; (4) to reveal the impact of the technological factor and bureaucratic practices on the changing nature of security, where securitization becomes an automated “pragmatic act” that precedes political decisions; (5) to outline the contours of the “security state” model, in which the permanent emergency regime and the priority of efficiency neutralize the traditional dichotomy between security and democratic freedoms.

4. Methods

The interpretivist approach is chosen as the methodological basis of the study, since the focus of the work is not on the measurement of quantitative indicators, but on the analysis of the construction of values, the evolution of concepts and the interaction of ideas in the scientific field of security research. This approach allows us to reveal profound changes in the understanding of security, which cannot be recorded by purely statistical methods. The key tool is qualitative conceptual analysis aimed at deconstructing and comparing the main theoretical narratives: from the liberal-institutional approach to neoclassical realism and critical security theories (Copenhagen and Paris schools). The method of critical synthesis of the available academic literature is also applied. This made it possible to combine disparate theoretical frameworks – the philosophy of technology (J. Ellul, P. Virillo), the sociology of security (D. Bigo, M. Neocleous) and the theory of international relations (J. J. Mearsheimer, R. L. Schweller) – to form a holistic model of the “security state” in the face of modern challenges. The empirical background for the verification of theoretical provisions is structural shifts in the system of international security caused by the growth of conventional threats.

5. Results and Discussion

The end of the XX century was marked by the undeniable triumph of liberal institutionalism in academic thought. This paradigm, which was once canonized by R. Keohane, was based on an optimistic hypothesis: international anarchy is a phenomenon that can be overcome through certain means of interaction and the formation of interdependence between states. It was believed that an extensive network of regimes and institutions was able to mitigate the harsh realities of the absence of a world government, reduce transaction costs and, most importantly, encourage states to cooperate for the sake of absolute benefit [14, pp. 89–90]. In such an intellectual atmosphere, any attempt at securitization – that is, transferring the problem from the plane of public debate to the “emergency” mode, the transition from the logic of economic cooperation to the logic of confrontation – was perceived as a deviation from the norm. Representatives of the Copenhagen School (in particular, B. Buzan and O. Wæver) directly called this a “failure of policy”, insisting on the need for “de-securitization” and a return to liberal procedures [5, p. 29]. In the optics of the classics of the Copenhagen School, it was liberal governance that remained the norm against which securitization formed a certain threat, legitimizing violations of the rules for the sake of security.

At the same time, the loss of stability in international relations, the deployment of a new stage of the arms race and the leveling of the effectiveness of international organizations and treaties have significantly hit optimistic theories, where interaction outweighs anarchy. J. J. Mearsheimer in his programmatic text about the collapse of the liberal order, noted: an attempt to impose a grid of universal rules on the world, while ignoring nationalism and the balance of power, was doomed from the very beginning [17, p. 9]. We are seeing a renaissance of fierce competition in interstate relations,

characterized by an increase in risks and threats to all global players, without exaggeration. As E. Goetz demonstrates on the example of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the actions of states are often dictated not by the ideology of the leader, but by the structural fear of the security environment, which no diplomacy is able to dispel [11, p. 303]. At the same time, the key weakness of liberal optics remains skepticism about anarchy in international relations, and, as a result, underestimation of crisis phenomena. If for the supporters of R. Keohane this is only a technical problem of uncertainty of intentions, which is solved by the exchange of information [14, p. 93], then for structural realists' anarchy is a constant, background threat bordering on the physical destruction or strategic defeat of the state. A kind of theoretical response to the positions of liberal institutionalists on the part of neorealists was the dilemma of "relative benefits", which was described by J. M. Grieco. According to J. M. Grieco, states behave not as rational actors, but as paranoid "defensive positionists". Thus, states, as a rule, will refuse even profitable agreements if the partner, which may be of the nature of a threat, wins more than them. The reason for this is, first of all, the idea that today's profit of the partner will turn into his rockets tomorrow [12, p. 498]. E. Goetz's study on Moscow's policy, carried out in the same vein, proves that aggression against Ukraine is dictated not by the simple political will of the leadership of the Russian Federation, but by the fear of changing the balance of power on the borders [11, p. 303]. Thus, ignoring security risks and underestimating the autonomy of the security factor can lead to serious negative consequences bordering on threats of loss of sovereignty. Replacing the security component with an economic one, de facto, cannot work as an effective means, especially given the strengthening of the conflict component of international relations. In the context of this situation, K. N. Waltz put forward an important neorealist thesis: in an anarchist world, "the gain in security weighs more than the welfare" [24, p. 126]. Choosing an economic priority with a significant security risk is thus a serious threat to sovereignty. Thus, the economy is not able to replace or remove from the agenda the security competition between states. J. J. Mearsheimer took his realistic concept even further, arguing that great powers always, at every opportunity, seek hegemony. At the same time, according to J. J. Mearsheimer, international institutions are a kind of "shadow" cast by the strength of the strongest [16, p. 52]. In unison with the works of J. J. Mearsheimer, S. Krasner [15] and R. Gilpin [10] note that the economy always stands on the shoulders of strength. Thus, securitization for these authors is not just an option; to some extent, it is the only available option related to survival as such.

Structural realism explains the sources of security threats, while neoclassical realism explains the reasons for the inert response to them on the part of modern democratic states. R. L. Schweller introduced the term "underbalancing". This is a dangerous state when the elites are split and society is passive. Instead of being "lions", states turn into "lambs" that hope that the predator will not touch them [21, pp. 6, 11]. It is in this context that securitization becomes an extremely important tool for managing political processes. T. Christensen shows that political leaders often have to use the strategy of "useful enemies". This is the only way to prove to an inert voter the need to spend money on defense [6, p. 17]. At the same time, the idea of defense is not necessarily an artificial challenge or a derivative of imaginary threats, which is important in the context of securitization policy. F. Zakaria makes an important distinction between the mere wealth of the nation and the real state power – that is, the ability of the government to mobilize these resources [26, p. 35]. Without securitization mechanisms, the state remains "weak", even if it relies on large resources. It is necessary to take into account the thesis of A. Gat, according to which war is a historical constant, while pacifism creates a strategic vulnerability, reducing the mobilization potential of society in the face of the threat of evolutionarily more aggressive regimes [9]. The "normative turn" in security studies firmly denies the idea of the "immorality" of security measures per se. M. Walzer formulated the concept of the "supreme emergency", according to which in the event of a serious threat to the very existence of the community, the state not only has the right, but it is obliged to act contrary to the rules of peacetime [25, p. 253]. Developing this idea, R. Floyd proposes the theory of "just securitization". Unlike the Copenhagen School, which interprets securitization as an a priori negative phenomenon, the researcher argues that the introduction of emergency measures can be morally justified and even necessary if it meets the criteria of a "just war". According to her approach, the legitimacy of securitization is determined not by the approval of the audience, but by the presence of an objective existential threat, the purity of the actor's intentions and compliance with the principle of proportionality, when the expected benefit from the protection of the reference object outweighs the harm from the restriction of rights and freedoms [8, p. 14]. Being in a similar position, the bioethicist J. Herington points out that a government that does not securitize mortal danger (such as an epidemic or military invasion) is committing an ethical failure. J. Herington considers

security not just as one of many political values, but as a “primary good”, which is a fundamental prerequisite for the implementation of any life plans and autonomy of the individual [13]. Since, without physical survival and basic stability, the enjoyment of other rights becomes impossible, the state has an unconditional moral obligation to protect citizens from existential threats. Therefore, the government’s refusal to apply emergency measures (securitization) in the event of a mortal danger, such as an epidemic or invasion, qualifies not as democratic restraint, but as a profound “ethical failure” and violation of the social contract.

Traditional realism, focusing on military capabilities, de facto loses sight of the fact that the state is not only a physical object (territory plus population), but also a social construct that has its own “I”. The need to protect state identity along with territorial boundaries legitimizes an appeal to the concept of ontological security, thanks to which securitization appears not only as a defense mechanism, but also as a way to meet the needs of the state organism for self-preservation. One of the classics of the ontological approach to security, B. J. Steele proposes considering the state as a subject that seeks to maintain the integrity of its “biographical narrative”. The implementation of a holistic foreign policy requires a clear self-identification of the state actor, since the state of uncertainty provokes ontological anxiety, which, due to its objectless nature, leads to strategic paralysis. Under such conditions, securitization performs a compensatory function, transforming diffuse anxiety into a rationalized fear of a specific adversary, which allows the restoration of institutional capacity. As B. J. Steele notes, states often choose a dangerous but understandable conflict routine to avoid the horror of uncertainty [22, p. 51]. J. Mitzen develops this idea by introducing a paradoxical thesis: states can be attached to conflict, because the conflict gives stability to identity, it allows you to structure the political space. A textbook example is the Cold War, which, despite the nuclear threat, was characterized by a high level of ontological security due to the establishment of clear identities: the United States as the “defenders of the free world” and the USSR as the “vanguard of socialism”. The disappearance of the enemy often leads to an identity crisis and the erosion of the structure of the political process. J. Mitzen argues that knowing who your enemy is and building your life around confrontation with him is a way to achieve cognitive stability [18, p. 342]. At the same time, the classic of agonistic democracy C. Mouffe, following the Schmittian academic tradition, makes a fundamental distinction between “politics” as a set of institutional practices and “political” as an ontological dimension of antagonism, which is an integral part of human societies. She argues that attempts by liberal thought to ignore this dimension are erroneous, since any collective identity (“We”) can exist only through the definition of the opposite (“They”), which makes conflict potentially present in any social relations [19, p. 9]. Thus, the securitization of another state or ideology often arises precisely to fill the identity vacuum. The ontological security approach to the phenomenon of securitization also has a certain potential for development in relation to the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is worthy of a separate study. For the newly formed states and countries of the Global South, this process becomes especially acute, because securitization becomes a tool for the formation of a nation. M. Ayooob in his theory of subaltern realism points out that Western democracies went through their bloody path of state-building centuries ago. For modern developing states, internal divisions and weakness of institutions are the norm. In such conditions, liberal approaches with attempts to avoid conflicts can become a death sentence for fragile statehood. M. Ayooob states: *“Internal conflict is not an anomaly (deviation), but an integral part of the process of state formation... Violence is part of the process of accumulation of power and consolidation of the state”* [1, p. 32]. The state must first form a political nation, often forcibly stitching together disparate regions with a single security narrative, and only as a result of this does it become possible to build effective governance and democracy. At the same time, the classics of the Copenhagen School (O. Wæver and B. Buzan) made an important distinction between state security (as countering threats to sovereignty) and social security (as countering threats to identity). They recognize that if a society loses identical markers under the pressure of globalization or migration, it actually ceases to exist, even if formal borders and institutions of statehood are preserved [5, p. 119]. This legitimizes the securitization of the humanitarian sphere. The protection of language or cultural space by methods of national security becomes a condition for the survival of the “Collective We”. Without this defense mechanism, society can disintegrate, turning into an amorphous conglomerate without a common political will, and the nation/society/state, as it copes with new challenges, loses the features of a political subject.

If the approaches of the XX century quite often described securitization as the result of a conscious choice of political elites (either under the pressure of the anarchy of international relations, or for the sake of mobilizing the nation), then a more focused view on the realities of the twenty-first century

makes it necessary to emphasize the fact that securitization ceases to be a “choice”. It turns into an autonomous, self-sustaining logic dictated by the development of technology. Thus, the structure of development and the social consequences of the introduction of modern technical means make the construction of a “security state” practically uncontested. One of the representatives of the Paris School of Securitization, T. Balzacq, made a significant clarification for the theory, proposing to move away from the linguistic focus of the classical Copenhagen School. Although the classics of the theory of securitization believed that security is created through the act of speech, T. Balzacq argues that security is created instrumentally. He considers securitization as a “pragmatic act” [2, p. 3]. In the modern world, the presence of a tool often precedes a threat, which determines the use of the tool outside the position of threat. The availability of biometric identification and big data processing tools at the disposal of the authorities creates prerequisites for their use, which is due to institutional inertia, and not only the response to new security challenges. The establishment of comprehensive monitoring systems actually translates interaction with the population into the plane of preventive securitization.

The process of preventive securitization with the help of technical means receives a philosophical justification in the works of the philosopher J. Ellul. In his monumental study *The Technological Society*, he introduces the concept of “Technology” not as a set of machines, but as a totalitarian logic of absolute efficiency. The equipment is autonomous; She does not obey morality or politics; she subordinates them to herself. According to J. Ellul, only the one who chooses the most effective means survives in a competitive system: “technology does not tolerate judgments about morality; it recognizes only judgments about efficiency” [7, p. 97]. In the security dimension, liberal democracies that limit the activities of intelligence services to ethical dogmas and the protection of privacy demonstrate less technological efficiency in organizing security compared to authoritarian regimes that use digital tools unlimitedly. In order to maintain strategic parity, democratic systems are forced to switch to a “technical” mode of functioning, actually implementing elements of authoritarian security models. At the practical level, as D. Bigo demonstrates, this leads to a change in the very nature of management. The state is moving from a panopticon (supervision of criminals) to a “ban-opticon” – the preventive exclusion of risk groups based on algorithms. D. Bigo shows that securitization is no longer the result of purely verbal influence on the development of political decisions. This is the result of the routine daily work of “threat management professionals” – bureaucrats, police officers, data analysts. In these conditions, they constantly produce new threat scenarios to justify the existence of their institutions, the expansion of budgets and the use of new technological tools. Securitization occurs “from below”, through the microphysics of power. D. Bigo notes: “*Securitization is not an exception, but the result of the constant activity of a network of professionals... who compete for a monopoly on determining what is threatening*” [4, p. 74]. The state turns into a machine that cannot help but look for enemies, but the bureaucracy always has a certain tendency to self-justify its need. In this context, the academic positions of P. Virillo with his concept of “dromology” (the science of speed) are also important. Modern war and security, according to P. Virillo, are primarily questions of speed. Hypersonic missiles, cyberattacks, automated drones reduce decision-making time from days to milliseconds. Democracy, by its nature, requires time: for debates, for voting, for agreeing on positions. P. Virillo emphasizes the fact that technological speed kills political time, because in the face of instant threats, decisions are transferred from a slow parliament to a fast executive branch, and from it to automated AI systems. In his work *Speed and Politics*, he states: “*speed destroys the democratic space, turning the citizen into a passive observer*” [23, pp. 30–31]. At the same time, P. Virillo directly emphasizes that speed is the essence of war, making it one of the key leitmotifs of his work. In the conditions of “increasing speed”, the capacity to wage war, self-defense and collective defense increases, but individualistic values are significantly leveled and the democratic space is destroyed. Thus, the ability to maintain a “normal state of affairs” with the dominance of democratic control over security is reduced due to objective technological factors that have a direct impact on the political system. Even those political actors who aim to “de-securitize” politics for ethical reasons remain not very capable of realizing this task, because technological reality and increasing competition make it impossible. The choice in favor of permanent, automated securitization began to look quite rational for political actors, because the alternative in the moment of threat is not freedom, but instant destruction by a faster and more effective enemy.

6. Conclusions

The analysis of the academic discussion on security threats to democracy carried out in the article allows us to assert that the critical approach dominant in Western academic thought, which considers securitization as a “pathology” of democracy, is theoretically untenable in the conditions of the modern security environment. Securitization is the process of mobilizing resources and establishing emergency management regimes in the face of growing risk, ceases to be a choice and becomes an imperative of survival. This undermines the dichotomy of “security vs democracy” inherent in the liberal political space, because the choice is automatically made in favor of the former, albeit with a delay.

There was a clash of several key factors in time (international anarchy, technological development and the specifics of political mobilization), leading to the inevitable construction of a “security state” as a reference model for the political elites of our time. As J. M. Grieco [12], K. N. Waltz [24], and J. J. Mearsheimer [16; 17] have argued, the anarchic nature of the international system and the dilemma of “relative benefits” make institutional cooperation fragile. In conditions where economic interdependence becomes vulnerable, securitization remains the only rational mechanism for preserving sovereignty. The analysis of neoclassical realists (R. L. Schweller [21], F. Zakaria [26], T. J. Christensen [6]) at the same time revealed the tendency of democracies to “underbalance” and strategic lethargy, the lack of a proper response to security threats at the time of their deployment, and the problems associated with the choice of course in the foreign policy confrontation. Securitization acts as a necessary tool for overcoming social entropy, allowing governments to transform potential risk into real state power and expand their response capacities. The philosophy of technology (J. Ellul [7], P. Virillo [23]) and the sociology of security (D. Bigo [4], T. Balzacq [2], M. Neocleous [20]) also indicate that the evolution of means of control and the speed of warfare makes liberal decision-making procedures obsolete. The state automatically evolves into a “safety machine” under the pressure of the efficiency imperative.

Thus, we observe a significant change that determines the further development of political systems in the world: securitization is transformed from a temporary measure (“an extraordinary means”) to a permanent principle of organizing political space. In the XXI century, the state’s ability to rapid, total, and legitimate securitization becomes the main criterion for its viability, ability to defend, and even a necessary component of attempts to avoid armed conflicts in the future.

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