




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## The Thinker V. Lypynsky on the Socio-Cultural Interaction of the Elite, Church, and Religion in the Context of Moral and Ethical Values

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### ABSTRACT

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
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The relevance of the study is conditioned by the necessity of a deep rethinking of the sources of Ukrainian conservative thought against the background of modern challenges related to the search for moral and ethical foundations for the consolidation of the nation and the formation of a new leading stratum in the conditions of Ukraine's War for Independence. Ukrainian historiosophical thought of the first half of the 20th century, against the backdrop of the formation of a modern nation and the crisis of statehood, required the development of ideological models to overcome "national chaos." Among the key thinkers of this period, Viacheslav Lypynsky stands out, whose classocratic and historiosophical concept aimed at establishing new moral and ethical foundations and reforming social institutes. The aim is to analyze V. Lypynsky's conceptual views on the socio-cultural interaction of the elite, the Church, and religious-moral values as a fundamental, system-forming element in the context of building an organic Ukrainian state. V. Lypynsky considered religious-moral values not as an auxiliary, but as an important, system-forming element for the consolidation of a new classocratic elite, which is based on the ethics of duty and opposes the "reign of gold and the boor." His philosophy, formed under the influence of the Roman Catholic tradition, perceived religion as the meaning-creating core of the nation and an all-encompassing Divine Cosmos that ensures internal moral discipline and prevents degradation and constant rebellion against state institutions. V. Lypynsky distinguished, but inextricably linked, the functions of the State (material power) and the Church (spiritual power). In his views, the Church acts as an institutional guarantor of values, providing transcendent legitimacy to the ethical norms of the elite (honor, loyalty, patriotism) and performing the function of a moral arbiter. Classocracy, unlike the Marxist understanding of class, was defined as an organic collective united by a common tradition and religious ethics. Analyzing the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, the thinker viewed it as a consequence of the value collapse of the elite, expressed in the allegory of "Don Quixotes without Faith" – leaders who lost the "knightly tradition" and their own faith, preferring the class bias of the Central Council and destructive populist mechanisms, for which he criticized democracy. V. Lypynsky's concept is a deeply ethical construction called upon to ensure the necessary moral sanction and "spiritual power" for the state. His ideal of classocracy proposed the only effective mechanism for ensuring stable and constructive relations between religion, the church, and the state. V. Lypynsky insisted that to preserve the spiritual equilibrium and political resistance of the nation, the state must ensure equal authority and organizational independence of all Christian churches in Ukraine. Turning to V. Lypynsky's legacy is timely, as his concept contains valuable lessons regarding the necessity of ethical political leadership and the search for moral and ethical foundations for the formation of a new leading stratum in modern Ukrainian state-building.

### KEYWORDS

Viacheslav Lypynsky, ethics of duty, classocracy, conservatism, nation, religion, church.



## Мислитель В. Липинський про соціокультурну взаємодію еліти, церкви і релігії в контексті морально-етичних цінностей

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### СТАТТЯ

### АНОТАЦІЯ

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Актуальність зумовлена необхідністю глибокого переосмислення джерел української консервативної думки на тлі сучасних викликів, пов'язаних із пошуком морально-етичних засад для консолідації нації та формування нової провідної верстви в умовах Війни України за Незалежність. Українська історіософська думка першої половини ХХ ст., на тлі формування модерної нації та кризи державності, потребувала розробки ідейних моделей для подолання «національного хаосу». Серед ключових мислителів цього періоду виокремлюється В'ячеслав Липинський, чия класократична та історіософська концепція мала на меті утвердження нових морально-етичних засад та реформування соціальних інститутів. Мета полягає в аналізі концептуальних поглядів В. Липинського на соціокультурну взаємодію еліти, Церкви та релігійно-моральних цінностей як фундаментального, системотворчого елементу в контексті побудови органічної української держави. В. Липинський розглядав релігійно-моральні цінності не як допоміжний, а як важливий, системотворчий елемент для консолідації нової класократичної еліти, що ґрунтується на етиці обов'язку та протистоїть «царству золота і хама». Його філософія, сформована під впливом римо-католицької традиції, сприймала релігію як смислотворче ядро нації та всеохоплюючий Божий Космос, що забезпечує внутрішню моральну дисципліну і запобігає деградації та постійному бунту проти державних інститутів. В. Липинський розмежував, але нерозривно пов'язав функції Держави (сила матеріальна) та Церкви (сила духовна). Церква у його поглядах виступає інституційним гарантом цінностей, надаючи трансцендентну легітимність етичним нормам еліти (честь, вірність, патріотизм) і виконуючи функцію морального арбітра. Класократія, на відміну від марксистського розуміння класу, визначалася як органічний колектив, об'єднаний спільною традицією та релігійною етикою. Аналізуючи поразку Української революції 1917–1921 рр., мислитель розглядав її як наслідок ціннісного колапсу еліти, що виражено в алегорії «Дон Кіхотів без Віри», провідників, які втратили «лицарську традицію» та власну віру, віддаючи перевагу класовій упередженості Центральної Ради і руйнівним популістичним механізмам, за які він критикував демократію. Концепція В. Липинського є глибоко етичною конструкцією, покликаною забезпечити державі необхідну моральну санкцію та «духову потугу». Його ідеал класократії пропонував єдиний ефективний механізм для забезпечення стабільних та конструктивних взаємин між релігією, церквою і державою. В. Липинський наполягав, що для збереження духової рівноваги та політичної відпорності нації держава мусить забезпечити однаковий авторитет та організаційну незалежність усіх християнських церков в Україні. Звернення до спадщини В. Липинського є своєчасним, оскільки його концепція містить цінні уроки щодо необхідності етичного політичного лідерства та пошуку морально-етичних засад для формування нової провідної верстви в сучасному українському державотворенні.

### КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА

В'ячеслав Липинський, етика обов'язку, класократія, консерватизм, нація, релігія, церква.

## 1. Introduction

A genuine historiosophical turn in the Ukrainian intellectual field became clearly defined at the end of the 19th century and reached its apogee in the first half of the 20th century. This period is characterized by an intense concentration of historiosophical motifs, conditioning its status as the highest ascent of Ukrainian philosophical and historical thought in the modern era. Given the greatest number of conceptual approaches, the most striking diversity, and the powerful influence on the formation of the socio-political component of the national worldview, this period requires a holistic analysis. Such an intellectual ascent was caused by several main factors. Firstly, by the processes of the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation, which, at the level of self-consciousness, required interpretive models of the past to substantiate its own political existence [11]. Secondly, by the active assimilation and reinterpretation of ideas from Western philosophy (mainly Neo-Kantianism, positivism, and “philosophy of life”), which served as a basis for independent Ukrainian philosophizing.

The central theme for thinkers of this time remained the comprehension of the process of the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation and the derivation of the laws of historical movement on this empirical basis [34]. Western European sources were mostly used as a toolkit for solving specifically Ukrainian historical problems. Among the most striking figures who created this tragic, yet intense and existentially significant philosophical-historical experience, one should single out M. Hrushevsky (1866–1934), I. Franko (1856–1916), B. Kistiakivsky (1868–1920), D. Dontsov (1883–1973), D. Chyzhevsky (1894–1977), and, undoubtedly, V. Lypynsky (1882–1931). It was in this context, at the intersection of the formation of the modern nation and the critical rethinking of European ideas, that V. Lypynsky’s classocratic and historiosophical concept was formed, which aimed to overcome the crisis of statehood by establishing new moral and ethical foundations and reforming social institutes [8; 9].

The first half of the 20th century in Ukrainian intellectual history is marked by an acute experience of history and intense reflections on the fate of ethnic collectives, in particular, on the past, present, and future of the Ukrainian nation and the world historical process. The activation of this “interpretive” approach to history has clear socio-political and spiritual roots. It is directly connected with the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation, the development of national self-consciousness, culture, and, most importantly, with the struggle for Ukrainian statehood in 1917–1920. Since philosophical-historical ideas often arose directly from national-political practice, they were frequently presented not in the form of professional academic discourse. The philosophical level of understanding the “ultimate foundations” of historical existence has to be extracted from artistic, publicistic, or ideological texts. Ideologues-practitioners (among whom were V. Lypynsky, D. Dontsov, Yu. Vassiyanyan) actively subjected the past to interpretation, striving to find advice in it for solving urgent problems of the present. These intellectuals believed that unraveling the mystery of history would reveal the fate of the Ukrainian nation. Cognition of this fate (which, in their opinion, makes the nation omnipotent regarding the future) became the highest goal of their philosophical quests [1, pp. 7, 25]. Thus, V. Lypynsky not only proposed a model of political reconstruction (the Hetmanate) but also developed a profound conservative philosophy of history, in which the socio-cultural interaction of the elite, the Church, and religion is considered the cornerstone for the revival of the organic hierarchical structure of society and the overcoming of national chaos.

The relevance of the study is conditioned by the necessity of a deep reinterpretation of the sources of Ukrainian conservative thought against the background of modern challenges related to the search for moral and ethical foundations for the consolidation of the nation and the formation of a new leading stratum in the conditions of Ukraine’s War for Independence. Turning to V. Lypynsky’s legacy is timely, as his concept of classocracy (*klasokratiia*) and emphasis on the role of religion in strengthening national unity contain valuable lessons for modern Ukrainian state-building and strengthening the spiritual resilience of society.

## 2. Literature Review

The study of the philosophical-political, historiographical, publicistic, and epistolary legacy of Viacheslav Lypynsky is of outstanding importance for a thorough understanding of the formation of the domestic state-building school and the conservative direction of thought. This ideological heritage became an intellectual response to the dizzying socio-political transformations of the late 19th and the first third of the 20th centuries. The modern understanding of conservatism, which is often associated with conventionality, caution, or conformism, does not fully reflect the depth of this ideological

direction. Since the 19th century, conservatism has been articulated as a clear political doctrine that arose as a direct reaction to radical political transformations caused by the French Revolution and general processes of modernization. Its main principles were: paternalism and the idea of a hierarchical structure of society; the desire to protect the existing order and preserve the traditional socio-political system; and opposition to ideas of simplified equality and the destruction of institutions. These principles, which were important both for the European aristocracy and for the American “Founding Fathers,” ensured balance, limitation of power, and the rule of law. V. Lypynsky’s views and practical activities fit organically into this tradition, focusing on the role of the elite, tradition, and religion as defense mechanisms of the state against chaos. Numerous publications by I. Hyrych, T. Ostashko, and Yu. Tereshchenko are dedicated to these aspects of V. Lypynsky’s creative legacy [9; 10; 24; 35; 37; 38].

V. Lypynsky’s ethical and socio-cultural views, which are based on conservative principles, are of significant interest to modern thought and are highlighted in the works of V. Masnenko, V. Nikonenko, and E. Yurchenko [20; 21; 40]. Traditionally, the thinker’s work was analyzed mainly through the prism of the history of political thought and political science, focusing on classocracy and the Hetmanite movement [2; 3; 25; 26; 27; 32; 33].

Research into the scientific and publicistic legacy of Viacheslav Lypynsky is a significant direction in the Ukrainian intellectual tradition (historical-philosophical, sociological, culturological). Central among his works that formed the national-conservative worldview of the 20th century are *Letters to Brothers-Farmers* (*Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv*), *Religion and Church in the History of Ukraine*, *Ukraine at the Turning Point*, and *Our Orientation* [14; 16–18]. Today, the thinker’s heritage acquires special relevance, as it is an important source in the context of solving modern problems of Ukrainian identity, the search for social solidarity, and the establishment of principles of ethical political leadership and the responsibility of elites. This necessitates a specialized approach to the study of his moral philosophy, the role of the Church, and religion as system-forming factors of the national elite.

### 3. Problem Statement

The object of the study is the philosophical-historical and sociological legacy of V. Lypynsky. We have defined the subject of the study as his conceptual views on the socio-cultural interaction of the elite, the Church, and religious-moral values in the context of building an organic Ukrainian state in V. Lypynsky’s works. Given the identified relevance and gaps in the scientific literature, we face a number of tasks: to analyze the place and role of religion, the Church, and moral-ethical foundations in the formation of the ideological basis of V. Lypynsky’s classocracy; to accentuate the allegorical images in the thinker’s creative heritage; and to determine exactly which moral-ethical qualities and social behaviors, in V. Lypynsky’s opinion, should be inherent in the new Ukrainian elite, directed towards state-building and influence on the broad strata of the population.

Research Hypothesis: V. Lypynsky considered religious-moral values (similar to the “knightly tradition” and “faith of the ancestors” in the Don Quixote allegory) not as an additional, but as a fundamental, system-forming element for the consolidation of a new national elite (classocracy), considering them a necessary condition for overcoming “national chaos” and successful state-building.

### 4. Methods and Materials

The materials for the study were the key publicistic and historiosophical works of V. Lypynsky, primarily *Letters to Brothers-Farmers*, *Religion and Church in the History of Ukraine*, and *The Tragedy of the Ukrainian Sancho Panza (From the Notebook of an Emigrant)*.

In the process of preparing the article, we used the following methods: the historiographical method was useful for clarifying V. Lypynsky’s views on the laws of the historical process, the role of the leading stratum, and the reasons for the loss of Ukrainian statehood; conceptual analysis was required to understand the content of such concepts in the thinker’s views and ideas as “classocracy,” “agrarian class” (*khliborobskyi klas*), “national aristocracy,” “nation-state” and their connection with the concepts of “faith,” “Church,” and “ethics”; the hermeneutic method was applied for the interpretation of allegorical images (“Don Quixote and Sancho Panza”) and the philosophical extraction of the “ultimate foundations” of historical existence contained in publicistic and ideological texts. We also used the historical-comparative method and the method of critical source analysis to analyze historiographical developments related to the problems of our article.

## 5. Results and Discussion

Illuminating conservative intentions in Ukrainian historiography and historiosophy, researchers traditionally turn to the works of such thinkers as Dmytro Doroshenko, Stepan Tomashivsky, and Vasyl Kuchabsky. However, a special place in this series is occupied by Viacheslav Lypynsky, whose ideological heritage represents a deep rooting in the conservative worldview tradition.

His monarchist-aristocratic preferences and clear orientation towards the interests of "(...) the settled agrarian knighthood, as the main conservative core of the Ukrainian leading stratum – composed of representatives of all classes (...)" [17, p. 7] created a distinct contrast with the egalitarian-socialist ideologies dominant among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. V. Lypynsky substantiates the necessity of restoring Ukrainian statehood in the form of a hereditary Hetmanate. He considered this political act critically important for restoring the hierarchical structure of Ukrainian society. The proposed model aimed to overcome ideological chaos, lack of discipline, and organization, which, in his opinion, were the defining features of the national liberation struggles of that time and were considered a consequence of the "non-bourgeois" (predominantly peasant) character of the nation. From the perspective of conservatism, the philosophy of history constructed by V. Lypynsky views the historical process as continuous. In this model, the moment of the present is a direct and necessary continuation of the past; thus, the layer of the past is necessarily present in the mode of "now." In contrast, the mode of the future does not play an extremely important role in understanding the integrity of the historical process, since stability and value are determined by the preservation of traditions and structures inherited from the past [1, p. 41–42].

The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset once substantiated that the formation of social views is a function of power and "spiritual power," not a spontaneous process. He argued that the majority of people are devoid of their own clear views, and therefore their coexistence requires the imposition of ideas under the pressure of a dominant force to avoid chaos and "historical emptiness." Thus, Ortega y Gasset emphasized: a change of power always leads to a change in dominant views, which is equivalent to a change in the "historical gravity" of society [22]. The need to influence the majority, which does not have formed views, articulated by Ortega y Gasset, is important for analyzing the formation and development of Ukrainian conservatism. This idea underscores the importance of spiritual strength and leadership in shaping social consciousness, which can be interpreted as a transition from an ideology of self-preservation to a strategy of national development [7].

Throughout a significant part of the 20th century, especially in the absence of statehood and the struggle for self-preservation, Ukrainian conservatism was primarily an ideology of defense and preservation of national heritage. Its main task was the protection of national identity, language, culture, and traditions from the constant pressure of imperial influences (primarily total Russification). In this context, the activities of conservative elites, including Viacheslav Lypynsky, Dmytro Dontsov, and subsequently a certain circle of nonconformists, were aimed at forming the idea of Ukrainians as an independent nation with rights and a historical past and resisting assimilation. This period of Ukrainian conservatism largely corresponded to Ortega y Gasset's concept of the necessity of "spiritual power" to prevent "historical emptiness." Without this force aimed at preserving basic national landmarks, there was a real threat of the erosion of Ukrainian identity [22].

Conservatism as an ideological direction of political thought arose as a direct reaction to radical social transformations, in particular, the global reform caused by the French Revolution (1789). The main goal of this direction was the protection of the traditional socio-political system. Its supporters, who mostly belonged to the nobility and clergy, actively opposed ideas of simplified equality, which were establishing themselves against the background of the destruction of natural and social institutional distinctions [35].

During the 19th century, the Ukrainian aristocracy, which traditionally supported monarchist-dynastic ideas, experienced a complex and contradictory process of national revival. This awakening manifested itself in the transformation of socio-national consciousness and a change in the political orientations of representatives of ancient noble-magnate families in Galicia. Similar trends were observed in Dnieper Ukraine among such families as the Halahans, Tarnovskys, Myloradovyches, Kochubeis, Tyshkevyches, Skoropadskys, Khanenkos, and Lyzohubs. Despite the dominance of liberal-democratic and socialist ideas in the Ukrainian national movement, the evolution of the consciousness of this aristocratic stratum indicated a desire to establish a balance of value, ideological, and political views within the conservative direction [29; 35; 37]. Assimilation processes, to which the Ukrainian people were subjected for a long time under the rule of empires, significantly narrowed the possibilities for the formation of center-right forces. As a result, in 1917–1920, these forces were poorly represented

and limited to the conservative camp. It relied on tradition-friendly landowners and a small Ukrainophile elite (landowners, administrators, officers). Although Ukrainian conservatism has deep historical roots (specifically in the events of 1648–1657), its theoretical conceptualization as a doctrine began only in the 20th century, and this process was complicated by the heterogeneity of its social basis [5; 31].

The rejection of the idea of independence by the Ukrainian left during the revolutionary upheavals of 1917 and their reliance on the utopian transformation of the former Russian Empire into a federation generated indifference to independence among a significant part of the Ukrainian population sympathetic to these ideas. During the existence of the Ukrainian State of Pavlo Skoropadsky, conservatism received its chance thanks to the support of landowners, entrepreneurs, and wealthy peasantry, who opposed the agrarian policy of the Central Council (Tsentralna Rada). However, a significant number of officials from the tsarist era were involved in governing the state; although considered professionals, they did not speak Ukrainian and did not possess even the rudiments of national political consciousness. Despite the Ukrainophile sentiments of the Hetman himself, actual power ended up in the hands of groups that were mostly indifferent or even hostile to the idea of Ukrainian independence. This was a natural consequence of the imperfect social structure of the nation and the denationalization of the greater part of the strata influential in society and the economy [6; 12].

The right flank of the Ukrainian political spectrum of that time was represented by the Union of Landowners (*Spilka zemelnykh vlasnykiv*) and the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party (UDkhp). The main problem was that the more influential Union of Landowners was under the control of large landlords, for whom socio-economic interests significantly outweighed national issues. Thus, while supporting Pavlo Skoropadsky's regime as long as it remained the only force capable of guaranteeing the inviolability of their property, the organization's leadership could change its position at any moment. In particular, the possibility of switching to the side of another force, for example, the Russian "White movement" with its ideology of restoring the empire, was not excluded. In other words, the Union, which represented a strong conservative force in Ukraine through its political leaders, was not truly Ukrainian. The only purely Ukrainian conservative party of the revolutionary era was the UDkhp. Its program was based from the very beginning on the principles of Ukrainian historical legitimism, recognition of the importance of state interests over social ones, and the idea of monarchism as the most successful form of the state. However, locally, most UDkhp organizations consisted mainly of intelligentsia, who failed to attract the genuine peasant-owner to the party [29; 39].

After the fall of the Hetmanate and the seizure of the Left Bank by the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party (UDkhp) moved its activities to emigration. It was there that the completion of the formation of a clear concept of Ukrainian conservatism took place, the founder of which was Viacheslav Lypynsky. The key principle of this idea became the model of a "territorial" (political) nation, based on the political integration of all residents of Ukraine regardless of their ethnic origin. In V. Lypynsky's opinion, only emphasizing the state-building aspect of the issue and drawing the attention of broad circles of society to the economic discrepancies between Ukraine and Moscow can become the basis for effective national-political propaganda [15; 18; 37].

In September 1926, Viacheslav Lypynsky wrote:

"When in the West, after the World War, 'victorious democracy' won and the reign of gold and the boor [Ham] ensued there; when in the East a nomadic, predatory, and ruinous horde began to rule; when my Motherland was 'firmly' divided between these two kingdoms of one Satan – it was difficult to write calmly and 'literarily' about monarchism, knighthood, settled productive labor, about patriotism, loyalty, honor, Christian love" [17, p. 5].

V. Lypynsky clearly distinguished the classocratic elite from the ochlocratic or oligarchic one. His ideal is based on the ethics of duty, not on the right of possession. The elite (the class of agrarians, knighthood) has a moral mandate for power only when it serves the common good (the people and the state), and not its own interests. This idea flows directly from his condemnation of the "reign of gold and the boor." The values that V. Lypynsky singled out (honor, loyalty, patriotism) are the code of conduct specifically for this elite. For him, honor is the ability to answer for one's actions and keep promises, even at the cost of one's life, which is the opposite of cynicism and unprincipled behavior. For Viacheslav Lypynsky, the social class is merely the starting base for building the state. He considered small, active social groups, the national aristocracy or elite, to be the true state builders. In his opinion, the elite is an active minority responsible for the creation of both states and nations. In his teaching on the elite, Lypynsky relied on the Machiavellian tradition of European sociology, represented by such thinkers as Pareto, Mosca, and Michels. These sociologists believed that the presence of a supreme privileged estate is an inseparable attribute of any social system. Lypynsky's view on the historical formation of the elite

is interesting. He believed that it often consists of people from foreign tribes. In particular, in the Ukrainian context, he assumed that the bearers of elite culture were not Ukrainians themselves, but Poles. The assimilation of Poles with the "Ukrainian folk mass" stimulated the process of its separation among Ruthenian tribes, and it was this process that he defined as "proper Ukrainianism, Ukraine" [4].

V. Lypynsky asserted that in every historical period of existence, a state nation has within its composition a key group of people that serves as the basis of its state existence. The thinker and politician developed his own typology of national aristocracies according to the method of organizing power: oligarchy, classocracy, democracy. He was able to formulate the characteristics of democracy and oligarchy quite clearly. However, regarding classocracy, his favorite but somewhat illusory sociological ideal, his sociological analysis was less precise. The definition of class according to V. Lypynsky, which emphasizes organic community, can be applied to the peasantry, but only to that which had not yet been decomposed by capitalism. If Karl Marx considered workers to be the main universal class, then for Viacheslav Lypynsky, according to his romantic worldview, this role was performed by the peasantry, which he called the agrarian class (*khliborobskyi klas*). He viewed agriculture as an art, contrasting it with factory, monotonous industrial production. For him, labor on the land contributes to the perfection of the individual abilities of the farmer, and the hired laborer is perceived as an assistant to the master, and not simply an addition to technological tools. Instead, the industrial class, in which Lypynsky included both workers and capitalist entrepreneurs, did not fit into his concept of a natural class. The dismissive attitude towards this class was conditioned by its insignificant role in the social structure of Ukrainian society at that time. The thinker saw Ukraine primarily as a state of a powerful class of agrarians. He acknowledged the existence of internal contradictions (between the rich and the poor) in this class but rejected the idea of class struggle within it [4].

It was the agrarians who were for him the main bearers of the state idea, to whom he directed his political project. The question arises: did a unified agrarian class really exist as an instrument of state-building, and was it possible to disregard the deep contradictions between the landless peasant and the landowner? Since V. Lypynsky was a landowner himself, his ideas about the peasantry and agricultural labor were often idealized, creating a worldview paradox: his political project did not have a specific, real addressee. Hence arises the need for a new class to carry out political construction. V. Lypynsky summarizes:

"We have an extremely capable, strong, healthy folk mass with a separate language, a separate peculiar culture, a mass that lives compactly on a precisely defined territory. We have, therefore, the basic static elements of a nation, which in theory can always serve as a basis for the desire to transform them into dynamic elements: for the formation from our unconscious ethnographic mass of a conscious and organized state nation. But in practice, with the exception of two eras in our history: the Varangian-Princely and the Gentry-Cossack, the organization of our ethnographic mass into a nation and a state did not succeed. (...)

The Ukrainian materially unproductive intelligentsia, which until now forms that group of candidates for political organizers of Ukraine, has very great merits before the nation in the field of cultural apolitical work. Without its participation, it would have been difficult for Ukrainian science, art, literature, and even Ukrainian cooperation to develop. But for political work, the Ukrainian intelligentsia has shown itself to be absolutely incapable. We will understand the reasons for this incapacity when we apply to the intelligentsia the same method of materialistic understanding of social relations which it itself so willingly uses in relation to other classes. (...)

What common tradition can our intelligentsia have, which by its origin belongs to different classes: clergy, bankrupt nobility, peasantry, philistinism, all sorts of *raznochintsy*, and which has only one common feature – declassment, that is, a break with any collective community tradition. No inherited experience, no inherited values: everything can and must be tried, and at the same time, there is nothing to lose. (...).

In our opinion, the class that is the only one capable of having the strength and authority needed in Ukraine to unite and organize the whole nation is our strongest of all Ukrainian classes, our agrarian class. (...)

First of all, what is understood by the concept of the agrarian class? In our opinion, a group of families who possess their own land and produce bread on this land with their own labor. The amount of land and the form of labor do not play a decisive role in the class consciousness of the farmer. Decisive for this consciousness is the fact of individual possession of land and individual labor on the land. (...)

We know that it is not for the remnants of the outdated Ukrainian nobility to take the heavy Ukrainian state sword into their senile hands. This sword will be wielded by a new state estate, which



will form from amidst the healthy, young Ukrainian peasantry. But this new estate must learn to wield this sword from the nobility. Without the old state tradition and state culture, our new state sword-bearers will get entangled in their weapons, injure themselves with their sword, and finally leave it to be ravaged by foreigners. (...)” [19, pp. 7–10, 15].

He calls the creation of this new authoritative stratum the most important cardinal problem. The idea of the Hetmanate in V. Lypynsky is a direct expression of his romantic-patriarchal convictions. He imagined the state as a large agricultural household, which, like any household, must have a Master (*Hospodar*). Understanding the shortcomings of existing monarchies (in particular, the arbitrariness of tsarist autocracy), the thinker strove to embody the ideal monarchy in Ukraine in the form of the Hetmanate. It was classocracy that he considered the most suitable form of organization of the governing elite for Ukraine. Unlike Marxism, where the class-forming feature is the attitude towards property, Lypynsky defined class as an organic collective united by a common tradition, psychological experiences, and physical kinship. Given such a definition, his concept of class resembles other social communities more, such as a clan or tribe [4].

Revealing his vision of the state-building process and the correlation of power and spirituality, the thinker-politician emphasizes that although the Church and the State have different functions, spiritual and material respectively, they are inextricably linked and cannot exist without each other, especially in the context of the national liberation struggle:

“It is not – I think – the task of the church – the representative of the eternal, spiritual, Divine – to do for us our current, secular, Caesarean work. This is our business, of secular people, to build our state with our material power: with our sword and our plow and industry. And if we were to demand from priests that they do this secular work of ours, that they gird their cassocks with swords and take up plows and factories, and we, secular people, will meanwhile quarrel among ourselves and with our priests about which religion is better and which will ‘build Ukraine’ faster for us – then with such a method of organizing our struggle for the nation and the state, we will neither gain a state nor ever become a nation, and we will only demoralize and compromise that church which would undertake this work not its own. Therefore, wise with two thousand years of experience, the Christian church acts well when it does not want to take up secular, Caesarean work not its own (...) The Church is a spiritual power; the state is a material power. Material power cannot do without spiritual power, and the state cannot do without the church, without religion, without its higher spiritual blessing and moral sanction for its fulfilled tasks. But spiritual power cannot perform the tasks of material power when it does not want to become a secular institution from a spiritual institution; when it does not want to change its service to the eternal, Divine, into service to the temporal, Caesarean, and when by this secular service it does not want to lose its halo of spirituality, its identical and binding for all, supra-secular spiritual authority, which is its essence, the justification of its existence. Religion and the church are needed by us, secular people, not only when we have already conquered a state for ourselves with our material power and organized our nation. It is needed by us no less in the very process of struggle. To win, we must have not only material power but, first of all, moral power. Besides a clear and distinct (like any military plan intended for war) secular faith of our own, a political ideology, we need a universal human faith in God, the help of both the church and religion is necessary” [19, pp. 17–18].

V. Lypynsky clearly articulates the function of the Church, rejecting its narrow-nationalistic or purely cultural interpretation. The Church, in his opinion, should not simply be an expression of the national soul or a cultural institution, but primarily – discipline. It is necessary as faith in eternal and immutable laws that stand higher than personal desires or will. It is this faith that gives a person the strength to rule over their own desires and overcome their own weaknesses. Without this internal moral discipline, no creativity is possible, neither state, nor national, nor cultural. Thus, according to V. Lypynsky, the Church serves as a defense of will, honor, and duty (key ethical categories of classocracy). For V. Lypynsky, the Church is the main institutional guarantor of the preservation of religion as a system of moral and ethical values. It, as a bearer of Christian love and faith, performs two critical functions in interaction with the elite: it provides transcendent legitimacy to the basic ethical norms which the elite must then emulate (respect for labor, honesty, solidarity) and acts as a moral critic and arbiter, reminding the secular elite of its Christian duty and preventing its transformation into a selfish oligarchy (“reign of gold”). V. Lypynsky saw the church (specifically, the Ukrainian Church) as an important factor of national identity, but emphasized that its moral mission must outweigh the political one. In the philosopher’s idealistic model, the socio-cultural interaction of the elite, the church, and religion leads to the creation of an ethical state (classocracy). The elite, which realizes its responsibility (honor, loyalty) as part of Christian duty (love, truth), is capable of ensuring a stable and just order [19, pp. 26–28]. We see that V. Lypynsky contrasts the Ukrainian conservative ideal (order, honor, loyalty,



based on Christian ethics) with the moral-ethical decline he saw both in the East and in the West. This interaction is not simply political, but a deeply civilizational response to the worldview crisis of that time.

Analyzing the creative legacy of Viacheslav Lypynsky and the circle of his ideas, it is necessary to emphasize that the thinker possessed a rare gift of critical thinking. This allowed him not only to deeply understand (on the basis of immense preliminary analytical work) the vital problems of Ukraine but also to rise above outdated dogmas and canons. His intellectual position made it possible to re-pose fundamental, basic, and foundational questions that the majority of “educated society” considered long resolved. Thus, his thinking was oriented towards a rational revision of existing socio-political axioms. It is these features of V. Lypynsky as a critical thinker and his analytical reflections on the past and future of Ukraine that make his legacy extremely relevant in the current complex and ambiguous period, which demands a vital choice from the nation.

In the context of the problems of our article, V. Lypynsky's work *Religion and Church in the History of Ukraine*, which we cited above, is of particular importance. In it, the sociologist, historian, and politician laid out his understanding of religion as the meaning-creating core of the nation, cognition, and intellectual comprehension of the history of the development of the native Church and religion for the formation of the national spirit. He viewed such comprehension as a difficult path and a symbiosis of various forces:

“It is understood that the main leadership in this spiritual path of ours falls to our Christian churches. But in fulfilling their task, they must meet support, receptivity, and recognition of their authority from the side of our secular people: representatives of political power and creators of political ideology. (...) Instead, there should be recognition and defense by the Ukrainian sword of the authority of all Ukrainian Christian churches equally. In other words: the Ukrainian state power, if it does not want to violate the Ukrainian spiritual equilibrium necessary for the existence of the state, cannot place any Christian church in Ukraine in a dependent relation to the state, nor in a state-humiliated or unequal position, but must care for equal authority, equal spiritual and organizational independence, and equal political position of all churches in Ukraine. Another path will lead in the end to a decrease in our spiritual, and consequently, political resistance against the East or the West and as a result will lead to cultural and state dependence either on Moscow or on Poland” [19, p. 56].

According to I. Siundiukov, the work *Religion and Church in the History of Ukraine* is not a classic study of the history of the Christian church or a theological treatise. In its essence, it is a political science essay in which Viacheslav Lypynsky focuses on the position of the Church in the socio-political life of the Ukrainian state and its influence on the formation of the socio-cultural tradition. The author directly warns the reader about his methodological approach, namely viewing religious matters through a political prism. V. Lypynsky consciously withdraws from discussing religious dogmas, evaluating denominations, or internal church organization, focusing instead on the position of the Church in states with different political structures (totalitarian, liberal-democratic, or monarchist-traditionalist) [30].

In this same work, V. Lypynsky sets out his political creed with exceptional clarity and transparency, which is rarely found in his other works. His position is based on a critique of democratic principles, which he views as an attempt to please the majority of voters, rather than a genuine desire to create something positive. This testifies to Lypynsky's deep rejection of egalitarian principles and his conviction that a system based on an “arithmetic majority” inevitably leads to populism and moral simplification in politics. V. Lypynsky explains the inevitability of moral degradation in conditions of democratic political competition, where the struggle for an “arithmetic majority of votes” dictates cynical methods, such as lying and flattering the people in exchange for their votes, and also requires playing on the worst human instincts. The thinker emphasizes that failure to follow these rules means losing the competition and inevitable transformation into an “enemy of the people” [19, p. 7]. V. Lypynsky decisively separates such a position of his from a possible understanding of him as hostile to the people, because, as the thinker rightly notes, his entire life is dedicated work for the good of the Ukrainian people: being an ethnic Pole, he adopted the Ukrainian language as his native one and involved his aristocratic stratum in the struggle for the creation of a free Ukrainian State [19, p. 8]. Thus, Lypynsky's rejection of democracy is substantiated not by an anti-people position, but by a moral-ethical imperative and a conviction in the destructiveness of populist mechanics for the fate of the nation [30].

V. Lypynsky emphasizes that religion and the church are needed by secular people not only after material victory but also in the very process of struggle. Victory requires not only material but, above all, moral strength. Besides its own political ideology, the nation needs a universal human faith in God and the help of the Church, since religion performs a disciplinary function (for V. Lypynsky, discipline is faith), which is capable of organizing the thoughts of the individual and developing the ability to

distinguish the boundary between Good and Evil. Also, Religion is an organic element of social organization, capable with its authority to contribute to the solution of important state tasks [19, pp. 17–20]. He, like a prophet, formulated a severe warning regarding elites, which has not lost relevance in our days. Pointing out that those who strive for various speculations, in particular on politics and religion, strive, first of all, for maximum freedom to achieve the greatest profits with the least effort. The thinker asserted that it is for this reason that such a type of political apex of society strives to limit the influence of religion, because with its moral guidelines and attention to authorities, it restrains selfish grasping instincts and, accordingly, cannot be acceptable for such a type of politicians. Consequently, these speculative elements try to free state life from the controlling influence of the Church and turn it into a “private enterprise” that does not oblige them to high moral standards. This testifies to V. Lypynsky’s deep understanding of human nature, which, in his opinion, persistently requires control and voluntary limitation by moral laws [30].

Yu. Tereshchenko, studying the worldview foundations of the life and activity of V. Lypynsky, notes that they were formed under the significant influence of the Roman Catholic tradition. Upbringing in a deeply religious noble family in Volhynia laid in the thinker an unchanging attachment to Christian belief. Religion was for his family a life-giving force that permeated all aspects of existence. V. Lypynsky attested to this deep devotion to the Catholic Church, in particular, in his correspondence. Yu. Tereshchenko cites in his article a letter from the thinker dated March 8, 1930, to Cardinal Luigi Sincero, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church in Rome:

“Born in 1882 in Volhynia in a deeply religious Roman Catholic noble landowning family, I carried from it a true attachment to the Holy Catholic Church, to which I have been and hope with God’s help to be faithful my whole life” [36, p. 3].

Perceiving Catholicism as one of the fundamental pillars of Western spirituality, V. Lypynsky updated the question of the necessity of instilling idealistic worldview foundations in Ukrainian society. He viewed the historical process of the formation of states as the result of a long and steadfast struggle for certain ideas, be they religious, dynastic, class, or others. In this context, the position of the church acquired special significance, because it was through honoring fighters and martyrs for an idea that this struggle was transformed into national memory and state-building consciousness. V. Lypynsky emphasized the important role of Catholicism in the formation and revival of nations. He believed that the influence of the Catholic Church remained decisive even when forces other than the religious idea was involved in the nation’s struggle. Thus, religious heritage was viewed by him as a powerful moral-ethical and state-building factor. Viacheslav Lypynsky repeatedly emphasized the inherited character of his feeling for the Ukrainian land, which came from generations of his ancestors. This idea symbolizes a dual ability: to defend the native land with weapons and to organize economic activity on it. Thus, for V. Lypynsky, Ukrainian consciousness was organic and innate, not acquired through rationalistic study. It was the consciousness of his stratum, which was historically included in Ukrainian processes and strove to find a worthy place in complex interethnic and interclass relations in the “Kresy” (Borderlands). From this organic sense of duty to the land, combined with a deep faith in God, crystallized the agrarian ideology in that noble environment which preserved the connection with agriculture. Such religious ethics became the foundation not only of the scholar’s worldview but also of his public-political activity. It determined his position: the realization that no event in the world happens without the intervention of Divine forces. These forces, according to the thinker, form the connection between all existing things: people, nations, nature – uniting them into an all-encompassing Divine Cosmos. V. Lypynsky believed that the solution of the most complex human problems, including the question of statehood, is possible only in the presence of a high level of religiosity in the people. Without religious ethics, a person loses the meaning of existence and degrades either to a passive observer or to a subject who recklessly chases the satisfaction of personal interests. The absence of faith, according to his position, provokes a constant rebellion against all social institutions that unite human units by God’s will: the state, the family. In this context, a person is viewed as a particle of the Universe, sent to fulfill a life task determined by higher forces. Only then, in a single ordered world, do the following acquire meaning: the labor life of the farmer, the heroism of the aristocratic stratum, the spiritual activity of the intellectual. In aggregate, these elements create a people and a nation, as opposed to an anarchized, eternally rebellious mob. V. Lypynsky considered classocracy the only effective mechanism capable of ensuring stable and constructive relations between religion, the church, and the state, minimizing the negative consequences of democratic processes [36, pp. 5–15].

Viacheslav Lypynsky, developing the ideology of modern Ukrainian monarchism, strove to overcome the one-sidedness of national development and strengthen the conservative (right) wing of the Ukrainian political movement. His concept was aimed at uniting competing currents within a single

political system and under a common law for all. His founding of the Ukrainian Union of Agrarians-Statists (*Ukrainskyi soiuz khliborobiv-derzhavnykiv*) and his constant organizational work on building the Hetmanite movement testify that, as T. Ostashko asserts, V. Lypynsky was not simply a theorist-idealist detached from life (as he is often portrayed), but a deep thinker and at the same time a real politician-practitioner. The key themes of Lypynsky's political treatise *Letters to Brothers-Farmers* are the interconnection of "nation" and "state." Unlike the then-common notions, Lypynsky believed that the Ukrainian nation would form only after the emergence of the Ukrainian state. This state would have to unite all its citizens regardless of their national, social, political, or religious affiliation. For him, the state was the primary condition for the formation of a unified political nation. Viacheslav Lypynsky was the first Ukrainian historian to carry out a deep analysis of the reasons for the defeat of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921. His views differed significantly from the position of Volodymyr Vynnychenko (author of *Rebirth of the Nation*), who placed socialism higher than national independence. Instead, V. Lypynsky emphasized that the socialist leaders of the Central Council narrowed the social base of the national liberation movement. This narrowing made it impossible to use the creative potential of the entire nation in all branches of state-building, especially in military affairs. V. Lypynsky, based on his own experience of 1917, was convinced of the ruinousness of the so-called class position of the Central Council. He noted that for the then Ukrainian political leaders he remained only a "pan" (lord), a "landowner," because he did not succumb to demagoguery and did not share SR (Socialist-Revolutionary) views. That is, he was rejected due to his social origin and conservative convictions, which reflected the class bias of the leadership. Analyzing the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution, the thinker defined its main reasons as the lack of a clear concept of state-building and insufficient unity among the leaders [23].

In his publicistic work *The Tragedy of the Ukrainian Sancho Panza (From the Notebook of an Emigrant)*, V. Lypynsky allegorically explores the relations between the leading stratum (Don Quixote) and the people (Sancho Panza), analyzing the ratio of idealism and realism in social life. Comparing European and Ukrainian elites, he noted that in Europe, Don Quixote (the aristocratic stratum), preserving the "traditional faith of ancestors," the "knightly tradition," culture, and experience of past generations, strove to pass this "treasure" to a new generation of pragmatists, that is, "Sancho Panzas." He asserted that without such a Don Quixote, "it would be impossible to imagine the existence of a modern European nation." When European "non-democratic national Don Quixotes" was believed by "primitive Sancho Panzas" and began to "lay down their lives" for the idea of the nation, then European nations arose. The situation in Ukraine, in V. Lypynsky's opinion, was the opposite: "only bodily Don Quixotes remained, Don Quixotes without faith in themselves, in their culture, in their destiny." The Ukrainian elite, having no faith and culture of their own, "went into foreign faiths, became foreign Don Quixotes." They "perished for Poland" or "created the might and power of the Great Russian Empire." V. Lypynsky believed that the national revival caught Ukrainian Don Quixotes, who had transformed into "repentant nobles and humble priests' sons," absolutely unprepared for the role of national leaders [13, pp. 397–406].

Thus, Viacheslav Lypynsky diagnosed the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution as a consequence of the moral and value collapse of the elite, which failed to become the bearer of the state idea, transforming into "Don Quixotes without faith." His ideal of classocracy and hereditary Hetmanate was not simply a political model, but a deeply ethical construction called upon to ensure the necessary moral sanction and "spiritual power" for the state (similar to Ortega y Gasset's concept). V. Lypynsky decisively contrasted this conservative ideal, based on the Christian ethics of duty, honor, and loyalty, with the destructive populist mechanisms of democracy and the selfish essence of the "reign of gold and the boor," which threatened national independence.

## 6. Conclusions

The analysis of the philosophical-historical and sociological legacy of Viacheslav Lypynsky confirms that the thinker considered religious-moral values as an extremely important and weighty, system-forming element for the consolidation of a new national elite (classocracy) and the overcoming of "national chaos" caused by both external and internal factors. His worldview, deeply rooted in the Christian tradition, perceived religion as the meaning-creating core of the nation and an all-encompassing Divine Cosmos that opposes the moral degradation of man into a selfish subject and prevents constant rebellion against the institutions of the state and family.

V. Lypynsky clearly distinguished, but at the same time inextricably linked, the functions of the State (material power) and the Church (spiritual power). The Church is the institutional guarantor of

values, performing a disciplinary function (discipline = faith) and providing transcendent legitimacy to the norms of the elite. It serves as a moral arbiter, preventing the transformation of classocracy into oligarchy ("the reign of gold and the boor"). The classocratic elite, in contrast, must be based on the ethics of duty and service to the common good, demonstrating a code of honor, loyalty, and patriotism.

V. Lypynsky diagnosed the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 as a consequence of the moral and value collapse of the elite, expressed in the allegory of "Don Quixotes without Faith." Ukrainian leaders, unlike European ones, did not preserve the "knightly tradition" and their own faith, failed to become bearers of the state idea, preferring class bias (the leadership of the Central Council) and destructive populist mechanisms of democracy, which he criticized for the tendency toward cynicism in the struggle for an "arithmetic majority."

Thus, V. Lypynsky's concept is a deeply ethical construction called upon to ensure the necessary moral sanction and "spiritual power" for the state, and his emphasis on the independence of all Christian churches aimed at preserving the spiritual equilibrium and political resistance of the nation. Viacheslav Lypynsky's views, especially in the part of the socio-cultural interaction of the elite, the Church, and religious ethics, contain a number of important lessons for modern Ukraine, which is fighting for its independence and identity.

Firstly, is the realization by the national elite of state duty over profit. It is necessary to implement the principle of "ethics of duty" for the new leading stratum (political, military, business). The elite must realize its role as service to the common good (the people and the state), and not as a means for satisfying personal or corporate interests.

Secondly, both the state and civil society must actively counteract those elements which V. Lypynsky condemned as the "reign of gold and the boor", that is, the speculative elite that strives to limit the moral control of the Church and society to achieve maximum profits (here we can make an adjustment for modern times, where the role of the Church and the religious factor is no longer as influential as in the thinker's times).

Thirdly, the realization that victory requires not only material but, above all, moral strength. The nation must actively cultivate the disciplinary function of religious and ethical norms, which help to see the boundary between Good and Evil in complex challenges.

Fourthly, the new elite must integrate the state tradition and culture of governance from previous generations to avoid the "tragedy of Don Quixotes without faith" and not lose the acquired "state sword."

Fifthly, it is important to strengthen constructive relations between the State and Churches, recognizing the Church as an institutional guarantor of moral-ethical values and an important factor of national identity.

Finally, it is important to adhere to the principle of equal authority, spiritual, and organizational independence of all Christian churches in Ukraine. This is the guarantee of the spiritual equilibrium of society and its political resistance to external influence.

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