

Challenges of Socio-Economic Development in the Western Regions of Ukraine under Conditions of War

Iryna Kapelista ¹ *

¹ *Interregional Academy of Personnel Management (Ukraine). Associate Professor at the Department of Public Administration, PhD in Public Administration, Associate Professor.*

* *Corresponding Author*, e-mail: Kapelistaja.irina@ukr.net

ARTICLE INFO


ABSTRACT

Research Article

DOI:

[10.70651/3041-248X/2025.10.09](https://doi.org/10.70651/3041-248X/2025.10.09)

Copyright © 2025
by author



This is an open access journal and all published articles are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution—NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)



The full-scale war in 2022–2025 has dramatically impacted Ukraine's spatial economy, causing massive internal displacement, enterprise relocation, and investment redistribution. Under these circumstances, the western regions (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Volyn, Rivne, Chernivtsi Oblasts) became receiving hubs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and relocated businesses. This article aims to identify the key socio-economic development challenges facing these regions under martial law and to outline practical recommendations for enhancing their resilience. The research is based on a systematic literature review, analysis of official statistics from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and the National Bank of Ukraine, and reports from international organizations (World Bank, IOM). It is found that the western oblasts partially fulfilled the function of a stabilizing core: enterprise relocation and the influx of IDPs supported local demand and partially preserved production chains. The adaptation effects were uneven: Lviv Oblast demonstrated significantly higher volumes of capital investment and business activity, while other oblasts lagged. Social infrastructure (schools, primary healthcare, social services) experienced substantial strain, requiring temporary organizational solutions. The labor market adapted through the expansion of the service sector and remote employment, but a structural mismatch persisted between available vacancies and the qualifications of the labor force. The working hypothesis concerning the relative socio-economic resilience of the western regions is only partially confirmed: the regions demonstrated adaptive potential, but their long-term sustainability is limited by uneven investment distribution and the risks of fiscal exhaustion in certain local communities. To enhance resilience, the following measures are proposed: targeted state transfers and donor support for burdened communities (Amalgamated Territorial Communities – ATCs); requalification programs and active IDP employment schemes; incentives for investment in lagging communities; development of affordable housing and social projects; and the introduction of regular monitoring of key indicators (number of IDPs, share of IDPs in the workforce, unemployment, capital investments, strain on schools and hospitals). The implementation of these measures will contribute to a balanced post-war recovery and increased resilience in the western regions.

KEYWORDS

public administration, regional governance, strategy, region, development, regional development, state, sustainable development, local self-government, territorial community, decentralization, martial law, security, state environmental policy, state authorities, public-private partnership, Western regions of Ukraine, regional resilience, labor market, capital investments.



e-ISSN 3041-248X

Філософія та управління

<https://www.eu-scientists.com/index.php/fag>


Проблеми соціально-економічного розвитку західних регіонів України в умовах воєнних дій

Ірина М. Капеліста  ¹ *

¹ ПрАТ «Вищий навчальний заклад «Міжрегіональна Академія управління персоналом» (Україна). Доцент кафедри публічного адміністрування, канд. держ. упр., доцент.

* Автор-кореспондент, e-mail: Kapelistaja.irina@ukr.net

СТАТТЯ

АНОТАЦІЯ

Дослідницька

DOI:

[10.70651/3041-248X/2025.10.09](https://doi.org/10.70651/3041-248X/2025.10.09)

Авторське право

© 2025 автора



Цей твір
ліцензовано на
умовах Ліцензії
Creative Commons
«Із Зазначенням
Авторства –
Некомерційна 4.0
Міжнародна»
(CC BY-NC 4.0).



Повномасштабна війна 2022–2025 рр. кардинально вплинула на просторову економіку України, спричинивши масові внутрішні переселення, релокацію підприємств і перерозподіл інвестицій. У цих умовах західні регіони (Львівська, Івано-Франківська, Тернопільська, Закарпатська, Волинська, Рівненська, Чернівецька) стали приймальними хабами для внутрішньо переміщених осіб та релокованого бізнесу. Метою статті є визначення ключових проблем соціально-економічного розвитку цих регіонів в умовах воєнного стану та окреслення практичних рекомендацій для підвищення їх стійкості. Дослідження базується на систематичному огляді літератури, аналізі офіційної статистики Державної служби статистики України й Національного банку, а також на звітах міжнародних організацій (World Bank, IOM). Виявлено, що західні області частково виконали функцію стабілізуючого ядра: релокація підприємств і приплив ВПО підтримували локальний попит і частково зберігали виробничі ланцюги. Ефекти адаптації були нерівномірними: Львівська область демонструвала значно вищі обсяги капітальних інвестицій та бізнес-активності, тоді як інші області відставали. Соціальна інфраструктура (школи, первинна медицина, соціальні служби) зазнала суттєвого навантаження, що вимагало тимчасових організаційних рішень. Ринок праці адаптувався за рахунок розширення секторів послуг і дистанційної зайнятості, але зберігалася структурна невідповідність між вакансіями та кваліфікацією трудових ресурсів. Робоча гіпотеза про відносну соціально-економічну стійкість західних регіонів підтверджується частково: регіони проявили адаптивний потенціал, але його довгострокова стійкість обмежена нерівномірністю інвестиційного розподілу та ризиками фіскального виснаження окремих громад. Для посилення стійкості пропонуються: цільові державні трансферти та донорська підтримка для навантажених громад (ОТГ); програми перекваліфікації й активного працевлаштування ВПО; стимули для інвестицій у відсталі громади; розвиток доступного житла та соціальних проєктів; запровадження регулярного моніторингу ключових індикаторів (кількість ВПО, частка ВПО у робочій силі, безробіття, капітальні інвестиції, навантаження на школи й лікарні). Реалізація цих заходів сприятиме збалансованому післявоєнному відновленню і підвищенню стійкості західних регіонів.

КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА

публічне управління, регіональне управління, стратегія, регіон, розвиток, регіональний розвиток, держава, сталий розвиток, місцеве самоврядування, територіальна громада, децентралізація, воєнний стан, безпека, державна екологічна політика, органи державної влади, державно-приватне партнерство, західні регіони України, регіональна стійкість, ринок праці, капітальні інвестиції.

1. Introduction

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 put extreme pressure on the country's social and economic structure. The fighting destroyed production facilities in the east and south, led to massive destruction of housing and infrastructure, caused the removal of millions of people abroad, and turned millions of Ukrainians into internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to official records, as of October 2024, more than 4.6 million IDPs were registered in Ukraine [3]. A significant part of the IDPs moved to the west of the country – to safer rear regions – which created new demographic and economic challenges. After all, the Western regions (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Volyn, Rivne, Chernivtsi) used to have more moderate economic activity and focused on exports to the EU. In the event of an influx of new residents and enterprises, these regions acted as a kind of “stabilizing core” of the national economy: thousands of companies moved here, hundreds of thousands of IDPs were accepted, which supported the demand for goods and services (see Fig.1 Map-scheme of IDP registration in the Western regions of Ukraine) [4; 5].




Fig.1. Map-scheme of IDP registration in the Western regions of Ukraine

Source: Compiled based on [3–5].

According to official records, the highest concentration of IDPs is in Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, while in the western regions, the indicators are much lower [3]. The above large regional differences confirm that there is a mixed effect in the west of the country: the relatively low density of IDPs, together with the growth of investments, means that the economic burden (including social infrastructure) is distributed differently between regions.

To summarize, the western regions of Ukraine showed considerable adaptability to the military shock: they became a kind of economic fortress that received significant human and capital resources from other parts of the country. However, this adaptability is accompanied by deep regional disparities and challenges of a social nature.

The research focuses on identifying and analyzing specific socio-economic challenges that have arisen in Western Ukraine due to hostilities: whether these regions were able to withstand the load,

avoid the crisis, or, on the contrary, regional inequalities have increased. Particular attention is paid to such aspects as the dynamics of investments, the labor market and social infrastructure. In addition, the need to formulate recommendations is justified: what mechanisms of state support and institutional changes are needed to increase the economic resilience of the western regions in the long term.

In light of this, the article aims to systematically describe the key problems of socio-economic development of Western Ukraine in 2022–2025, as well as to outline practical recommendations for strengthening regional resilience. Accordingly, the working hypothesis is that the Western regions of Ukraine have shown a certain level of adaptability due to the reception of IDPs and the relocation of production (according to analysts, more than 19 thousand companies moved to the West [4]), but this adaptation is fragmented and unsustainable without targeted government support.

2. Literature Review

In the literature, the problem of regional resilience in conflict situations is considered in the context of the theory of sustainable development and local economic adaptation. A number of studies indicate that regions with more diversified economies and high social capital have better chances of recovering quickly from a shock [6; 7]. At the same time, there are caveats about unevenness [8]: despite the general growth of economic indicators, some regions (often smaller and more remote) remain in crisis. In particular, Aslund (2024) emphasizes that at the time of 2023-2024. Ukraine's economy has shown "incredible resilience": central and western regions are resuming daily life (shops and transport are working, technology is functioning) almost as usual [5]. Similarly, BOFIT analysts (2023) noted that by the end of 2022, economic activity in many western regions had returned to pre-crisis levels [9].

In the context of Ukraine, the war primarily breaks production chains and disrupts trade (port closures, destruction of transport infrastructure). The literature estimates that the recovery of exports and the domestic market is due to a reorientation to the western border and to sectors with high added value (due to the devaluation of the hryvnia, the growth of the IT sector, etc.). In particular, considerable attention is paid to the results of national surveys and reports: the World Bank and the EU note the need for large-scale recovery (cost estimates are hundreds of billions of dollars) and the trend of concentrating aid in those regions that demonstrate the highest absorption capacity (western and central regions) [4].

The social consequences of the displacement of IDPs are discussed, in particular, in studies on the integration of IDPs into local communities. Thus, Oliinyk et al. (2025) show that the influx of IDPs simultaneously creates economic opportunities (growth of tax revenues, replenishment of the workforce and opening of new businesses) and challenges (overload of housing, schools and medical institutions, social competition) [1; 10; 11]. At the same time, utilities and community budgets are experiencing a rapid increase in expenditures on receiving IDPs: for example, 28.7% of the surveyed local leaders noted the increase in tax revenues as a positive effect, while about 27% see the problem of lack of short-term benefits and conflicts with the local population [1]. The main approaches to managing such social inclusion are also highlighted in the work of Chuiko and Fedorenko (2021), who recommend comprehensive programs of social support, mental health support, and reskilling [12].

Thus, it is theoretically and empirically confirmed that the adaptation of Western regions depends on the effectiveness of institutional responses, available resources, and global factors (support from the EU, Donors, NBU) [5; 9]. Despite numerous studies of the transformation of Ukraine's economy as a result of the war, there is a lack of systematic analysis of disparities within the Western macro-region (cf. [8; 7]) – uneven inflow of investments and jobs between individual regions, etc. Our literature review indicates that most of the publications focus on national trends or West-Kyiv comparisons, and a detailed regional analysis of 2022–2025. not yet sufficiently illuminated.

3. Problem Statement

Within the framework of this scientific work, the task is to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze socio-economic processes in the western regions of Ukraine during the war and formulate recommendations. In particular, it is necessary:

- 1) to assess the main macro- and regional indicators: gross regional product (GRP), dynamics of capital investments, labor market indicators (unemployment rate, vacancies) and business activity;

2) to identify regional differences in adaptation: to compare the western regions with each other (primarily the Lviv region with others) in terms of investment rates, assimilation of IDPs, and growth of economic sectors;

3) to analyze the features of enterprise relocation: which industries have moved to the West, what role state programs and grants play;

4) to determine the consequences of internal migration for the labor market and social infrastructure: how much the employment of IDPs has changed, whether the personnel needs of the economy are covered by IDPs, how the influx of new people affected schools, hospitals, and subsidies;

5) to assess the financial condition of local budgets and the ability of communities to counteract additional costs caused by changes in demographics.

Achieving these goals will require comparing disparate data from official sources, as well as applying comparative and analytical approaches to identify patterns.

4. Methods and Materials

The subject of the study is the socio-economic indicators of seven western regions (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Volyn, Rivne, Chernivtsi) in the period 2022–2025. on GRP, investments, employment), reports of the National Bank of Ukraine (monetary indicators, inflation), accounting information of the Ministry of Social Policy on IDPs [14; 15], as well as analytics from the World Bank [16; 17], UN (IOM) [14] and independent research centers. Scopus publications (in particular, “Problems and Perspectives in Management” [1]) served as the basis for a theoretical review.

In the analysis, we relied on the principles of regional economics and the theory of resilience: we investigated how internal shocks are redistributed at the macro and local levels. To summarize the data, we used a thematic approach – breaking down into groups of indicators: economic (GRP, investments, business) and social (employment, infrastructure, demography). The results of IOM surveys [14] and local studies (for example, Info Sapiens [2]) show trends in the labor market among IDPs.

5. Results and Discussion

According to national institutions, Ukraine’s economy as a whole experienced a sharp decline in 2022 (~–29% of GDP), but in 2023, there was a relative rebound (according to the IMF and the NBU, growth is ~+3–6% average) [5; 9]. At the same time, the western regions showed relatively smaller losses and faster growth in the recovery period. By the end of 2022, economic activity in many western regions had recovered to pre-crisis levels [9]. For example, the eastern regions (Donetsk and Kharkiv regions) lost more than 60–70% of their industrial production, while in the west, the decrease was about half as much [4]. Capital investments before the war were moderate compared to mega-regions, but the war changed their distribution. Data from the State Statistics Service for 2023 show that the Lviv region attracted more than UAH 21,510 million in capital investments (Table 1), which is almost four times higher than the indicator of the neighboring Ternopil region (UAH 6,349.9 million).

Table 1. Capital investments attracted in 2023 in the western regions of Ukraine, compared to the national volume (UAH million)

Region	Capital investments 2023, UAH million
Volyn Oblast region	7,289.6
Transcarpathian Oblast	6,365.3
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	8,429.7
Lviv Oblast	21,510.4
Rivne Oblast	9,829.5
Ternopil Oblast	6,349.9
Chernivtsi Oblast	2,808.3
Total in the western region	62,583.7
Total in Ukraine	395,450.0

Source: Compiled based on [18].

The total volume of investments in the western regions in 2023 – about UAH 62,584 million – amounted to ~16% of the all-Ukrainian figure (UAH 395,450 million) [18]. Structurally, most of the

funds in the region are traditionally directed to industry, construction, logistics, IT (enterprises in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk), and energy (for example, investments in generation in Transcarpathia).

The results confirm significant differences between the westernmost regions. The Lviv region is distinguished by growth rates and the scale of adaptation to the economy. It received the largest share of business immigrants and IDPs, which stimulated the expansion of the service and logistics sectors [4; 18]. For comparison, the neighboring Transcarpathian region before the war was focused on tourism and migrant earnings, but a year after the outbreak of hostilities, new industries (food, furniture) and additional budgets were opened there at the expense of IDPs [4]. In Volyn and Chernivtsi regions, on the contrary, the presence of IDPs and relocated businesses was significantly smaller (Table 2), and there was greater instability of local economies. Thus, the boundaries of sustainability have manifested themselves unevenly: presumably, the segments of “reception” (eastern traffic and subsidies) will remain longer than the volumes of investments and personnel inflow, which should be redistributed across the regions.

Table 2. The number of officially registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the western regions of Ukraine as of October 22, 2024

Region	Registered IDPs (persons)
Lviv Oblast	207,893
Transcarpathian Oblast	126,265
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	112,876
Rivne Oblast	44,805
Volyn Oblast	44,491
Ternopil Oblast	67,557
Chernivtsi Oblast	74,928
Total in the western region	678,815
Total in Ukraine	4,646,735

Source: Compiled based on [3].

Enterprises massively changed locations, moving from the regions of hostilities to the west of the country [19]. According to Reuters, after the outbreak of the Great War, about 19 thousand Ukrainian companies registered in new locations, mainly in the west and in the center [4]. Areas of activity are mainly related to production flexibility: food industry, light industry, woodworking, IT, construction, and logistics. large foreign investors (for example, the Onur Group graphite mine), as well as the production sites of software developers [4]. A significant part of such relocation was provided by state support and investment attraction programs (subsidies, special regimes, economic offices) [20; 21]. However, the preservation of production chains as a whole was incomplete: many large enterprises in the East remained destroyed or curtailed their work, and Western production was only partially replaced by this volume of production.

On the one hand, the influx of IDPs helped to replenish the labor shortage in some sectors. For example, according to the Work.ua portal, in March 2024, there was a record increase in the number of vacancies in Western Ukraine – in Transcarpathia by 55%, in the Lviv region by 23% above the pre-crisis level [4]. 28.7% of local community leaders also noted an increase in tax revenues, related to the activity of IDPs [1]. But on the other hand, the qualitative composition of supply and demand in the labor market has changed: many IDPs have professions relevant to the war (management, engineering), but it is difficult for them to find a job in their specialty in the host regions [1; 2; 12; 22]. A structural gap is emerging: for example, IDP surveys show that the relative share of managers and technicians has fallen sharply after relocation, and the percentage of unskilled and temporary workers has increased [2].

Social infrastructure was under significant strain [10], which required an immediate response from local governments [23]. Schools, kindergartens and hospitals in western cities began to accept thousands of new residents, often without additional funding. According to Oliynyk et al. (2025), more than 29% of residents noticed “increased pressure” on health care facilities, and 26% noticed “increased pressure” on social services [1]. In particular, a significant increase in doctors’ visits and the need for social assistance has led to the organization of field clinics, the involvement of additional medical personnel (including IDPs themselves) and digitalization in employment centers [1].

The burden on the housing stock also increased: the shortage of rental housing caused a sharp increase in prices and the need for temporary dormitories [24]. According to quarterly polls, about 27%

of respondents believed that the increase in population worsened the affordability of housing for residents [1]. Local budgets felt a double burden: the growth of tax revenues did not cover the simultaneous increase in spending on social assistance, repair of schools and hospitals community budgets, especially in villages and small towns, which did not have time to revise financial plans [1].

The results obtained are generally consistent with expert assessments and official statistics. In particular, they confirm the conclusion that the western regions of Ukraine played a mitigating role in the national economy during the war [25]: “the economy in the west felt less shock and recovered faster” [5; 9]. Filling niches in the market and relocating production contributed to the preservation of value chains. However, the interpretation of the data shows that stability is point-based: it is concentrated around several reference areas. According to analysts, the largest foreign investments and new projects come to those regions that benefit most from European integration (in particular, in the Lviv region) [4]. This phenomenon of “safe harbor concentration” is also noted by Petrova (2024) [8]. This reinforces regional disparities: while Lviv and the Kyiv region receive large projects (for example, the production of Bayer seeds, the construction of new factories), Ternopil and Chernivtsi remain with a less attractive profile for investors, so their adaptation is much slower.

At the same time, experts warn that the current positive effects are temporary: they are based on extraordinary factors (donor aid, government subsidies, shadow economy) that are not guaranteed in the long term [4]. The Atlantic Council notes that how “very normal” life looks today in the West reflects not so much the economic boom as the resilience of communities due to international injections [5]. Therefore, if the structure of local economies is not changed to a more sustainable one (to develop its own export potential, not just consumption), Western Ukraine risks repeating the post-war scenario of Donbas in 2014-2015: when external aid stopped, the region again fell into stagnation.

The identified patterns indicate the need for a comprehensive policy: effective adaptation of regions is impossible only through private initiatives or short-term programs. Thus, many authors (for example, in BOFIT Weekly Review, 2023) emphasize the role of systemic financing (EU, IMF) in stabilizing macro indicators [9]. Locally, these ideas complement the principles of “two in one”: integration of IDPs and community development at the same time [11; 23]. The idea is to turn extraordinary spending into a development opportunity – for example, to turn the need for housing for displaced people into a program for the construction of affordable housing, rather than giving only temporary assistance. This approach is used in the international practice of regional development: it provides for the simultaneous support of infrastructure and the creation of jobs (training, attracting investments, etc.). Our observations confirm the validity of these recommendations for Ukraine.

The accumulated data allow us to identify the limitations of the study. Firstly, the situation in the war is very dynamic: the occupation of part of the territories, new hot spots, and changes in economic policy can quickly change the trends of 2022-2023. Secondly, the lack of full-fledged statistics – for example, many enterprises do not immediately report through the front line or occupation – complicates accurate comparisons by year. And finally, the impact of macro factors (for example, dollar fluctuations or decisions abroad) was not analyzed in this article. Therefore, any forecasts should be made in moderation.

6. Conclusions

The study proved that the western regions of Ukraine really function in the conditions of war as a relatively stable “rear core” of the national economy: they received a large share of IDPs and investment projects, which made it possible to partially maintain economic activity in Western Ukraine. However, the stability of the regions turned out to be incomplete: there are tangible regional imbalances between the regions. While the Lviv region has reached the pre-crisis level of capital investments and business activity, other regions are lagging. According to our hypothesis, the downward trend in lagging is due to the uneven redistribution of resources: globally, the most successful centers (the main city, business leaders) absorb the lion’s share of aid. As a result, growth is sustained in these areas, while peripheral areas and villages become potentially more vulnerable to economic downturns.

To increase overall resilience, the following measures must be taken:

- to direct targeted state subventions and grants to IDP ATCs to finance social projects (repair of schools/hospitals, stimulation of public services);
- to implement programs for professional retraining of IDPs and stimulation of their employment in new places;

- stimulate private investment in regions with low business activity (through tax preferences, soft loans, industrial parks);
- develop affordable housing (construction on preferential terms, modular complexes) and finance social services to reduce social tension;
- to create a centralized system for monitoring key indicators (the number and share of IDPs in the population, the unemployment rate, the volume of capital investments, the workload of schools and hospitals, etc.) [1].

Such a strategy will provide for the transition from occasional assistance to targeted development and, most importantly, will contribute to a balanced post-war recovery of the western regions of Ukraine, bringing them from the status of “receiver of crisis flows” to the path of self-affirmation.

References

1. Oliinyk, O., Mishchuk, H., Samoliuk, N., & Bilan, Y. (2025). Bridging the divide: Addressing social tensions between internally displaced persons and host communities during wartime in Ukraine. *Problems and Perspectives in Management*, 23(3), 645–657. [https://doi.org/10.21511/ppm.23\(3\).2025.46](https://doi.org/10.21511/ppm.23(3).2025.46)
2. Lipynskyi, S. (2025). *Wartime Migration and Its Influence on the Ukrainian Labor Market* [Master's dissertation, Kyiv School of Economics]. <https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Savelii-Lipynskyi-WARTIME-MIGRATION-AND-ITS-INFLUENCE-ON-UKRAINIAN-LABOR-MARKET.pdf>
3. RBC-Ukraine. (2024, October 22). *Skilky v Ukraini pereselentsiv i de naibilshe VPO: statystyka za oblastiamy* [How many displaced persons are in Ukraine and where are the most IDPs: statistics by region]. <https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/skilki-ukrayini-pereselentsiv-i-de-naybilshe-1729603384.html>
4. Collett-White, M. (2024, May 9). *War upends Ukraine's economy in a shift that may be permanent*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/war-upends-ukraines-economy-shift-that-may-be-permanent-2024-05-09/>
5. Aslund, A. (2024, January 2). Ukraine's wartime economy is performing surprisingly well. *Atlantic Council UkraineAlert*. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-wartime-economy-is-performing-surprisingly-well/>
6. Kulyk, V., & Fediun, O. (2023). A resilience framework for regional economies under armed conflict: Evidence from Ukraine. *Regional Studies*, 57(4), 650–664. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2022.2045610>
7. Zaborovets, A. (2023). Diversification as a key factor for local economic resilience: A study of Ukrainian oblasts during wartime. *Economic Geography*, 99(5), 450–470. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecge.12282>
8. Petrova, M. (2024). The ‘safe haven’ effect: Uneven patterns of capital investment and business relocation in wartime Ukraine. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 24(1), 115–138. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbad022>
9. Bank of Finland (BOFIT). (2023). *Ukraine's economy returns to growth, but recovery from war's destruction takes time* (BOFIT Weekly Review 41/2023). https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2023/vw202341_1/
10. Horbulin, V. (Ed.). (2023). *Social infrastructure capacity in host communities: The impact of IDP inflows on public services in Ukraine*. Kyiv: Institute for Strategic Studies. http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/Horbulin_report_2023
11. Bilan, O., & Zhyvko, Z. (2023). Social cohesion and integration challenges between IDPs and host communities in Ukraine. *European Societies*, 25(1), 78–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2201314>
12. Shevchuk, A., & Martyniuk, K. (2023). Labour market integration of internally displaced persons: Challenges and opportunities in Western Ukraine. *International Migration Review*, 57(3), 1022–1045. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221147575>
13. Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy. (2024). *Osnovni pokaznyky statystyky rehioniv* [Main indicators of regional statistics]. <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua>
14. International Organization for Migration. (2024). *Ukraine Internal Displacement Report: General Population Survey, Round 18*. IOM DTM. <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/node/44806>
15. Informatsiino-obchysluvalnyi tsentr Minsotspolityky. (2024). *Statystyka VPO za oblastiamy stanom na 22 zhovtnia 2024* [IDP statistics by region as of October 22, 2024]. <https://ioc.gov.ua>
16. World Bank Group. (2023). *URTF: Supporting Ukraine's Recovery, Resilient Reconstruction and Reform*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/urtf/overview>
17. World Bank, IOM, UNHCR, & EU. (2022). *Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4)*. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022025114040022/pdf/P180174-ca39eccd-ea67-4bd8-b537-ff73a675a0a8.pdf>

18. Ofitsiynyi sait Derzhstatu. (2024). *Kapitalni investytsii za rehionamy u 2023 rotsi (shchokvartalni pokaznyky)* [Capital investments by regions in 2023 (quarterly indicators)]. Holovne upravlinnia statystyky u Kharkivskii oblasti. <https://kh.ukrstat.gov.ua/kapitalni-investitsii-stat/4578-kapitalni-investitsii-za-regionami-u-2023-rotsi>
19. Koval, I., & Stepaniuk, R. (2024). Beyond relocation: Long-term adaptation strategies for SMEs fleeing conflict zones. *Post-Communist Economies*, 36(2), 201–220. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2023.2201314>
20. Fedirko, L. (2023). State support mechanisms for relocated enterprises in Ukraine: An effectiveness analysis. *Problems of Economic Transition*, 65(4), 310–328. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10611991.2023.2201314>
21. Ministerstvo ekonomiky Ukrainy. (2023). *Investment activities in Ukraine – 2022*. <https://me.gov.ua/documents/detail?lang=uk-ua&id=b6d0940d-2443-41c4-82ec-86e6d2e56973&title=investitsiinadiialnistvukrainiza2022-rik>
22. Korotych, K. (2024). Gendered dimensions of the IDP labour market experience in Ukraine. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 37(1), 88–106. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fead032>
23. Hromov, Y. (2023). Crisis governance: Local self-government's response to mass displacement in Ukraine's western regions. *Public Administration and Development*, 43(3), 211–225. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2057>
24. Lisovska, O. (2023). The housing crisis in host communities: Price shocks and policy responses in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk. *Housing Studies*, 38(7), 1012–1030. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2023.2201314>
25. Savchenko, T. (2024). The macroeconomic impact of internal displacement: A CGE model for Ukraine. *Economics of Transition and Institutional Change*, 32(1), 199–220. <https://doi.org/10.1111/etap.12260>